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INTENT IS ENOUGH:
INVIDIOUS PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING

JUSTIN LEVITT*
ABSTRACT
When the Supreme Court last seriously grappled with partisan
gerrymandering, all nine Justices concluded that an excessive
injection of politics in the redistricting process violates the Constitution, but failed to agree on what is excessive (or who should decide).
Commentators have since offered no shortage of assistance, offering
various models to resolve exactly “how much is too much.” This effort
is a sprint to answer the wrong question. It is perhaps the question
Justices have asked, but not the one best illuminating the problem.
This Article suggests an alternative: not “how much,” but “what
kind.” The Court wants to distinguish egregious unconstitutional
partisanship from normal politics. In this endeavor, the nature of the
intent, not the magnitude of the impact, matters more. A pivotal case
from the October 2016 Term reveals that the invidious intent of a
state actor to subordinate others based on perceived partisan affiliation constitutes a constitutional violation, no matter the severity of
any resulting injury. Testing for this intent provides the screening
device the Justices seek. Furthermore, this analysis reveals that the
scholarly community’s quantitative tests to assess gerrymandering
are valuable, but not for the reason most think: not because they
show the threshold of impact necessary for a violation, but because
they offer suggestive evidence of invidious intent.

* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am grateful to the participants
of the William & Mary Law Review 2020 Redistricting Symposium for supplying food for
thought, and I would particularly like to thank Rick Hasen, Aziz Huq, Michael Kang, Pam
Karlan, Lisa Marshall Manheim, Michael Parsons, Rick Pildes, and Cameron Schroeder for
their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors, of course, are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Academics, litigators, and politicians are notoriously averse to
harmonious consensus. So we ought to take just a moment to celebrate a truly wondrous achievement. Against all odds, the Supreme
Court has managed to unite a multitude of warring factions around
one shared truth: partisan gerrymandering doctrine is, at present,
a hot mess.
It is difficult to evaluate or critique the present doctrine of the
Court with respect to partisan gerrymandering because the Court
has offered little doctrine to evaluate. Various Justices have issued
various opinions that have failed to command a majority or illuminate a durable path forward. Claims of partisan gerrymandering
are, at least at the moment, justiciable. But, as political scientist
Gary King memorably put it, none have thus far been sufficiently
“justished” for the Court to deliver a meaningful and stable doctrinal standard.1
The status quo is chaos, yes.2 But it is also opportunity. In the
October 2017 Term, the Court is considering a Wisconsin case, on
direct appeal of a finding that a challenged redistricting plan was
unconstitutionally drawn.3 The Court will have to decide something.
Practitioners, scholars, and courts have put forth arguments and
theories now pitched on unusually fluid terrain. Given the shards
of past precedent, there are many plausible paths forward.
This Article surveys the landscape with a modest step back. Other
scholars have attempted to craft standards addressing what the
Court has requested—or more precisely, what Justice Anthony
Kennedy has requested.4 Instead, this Article addresses what the
1. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in
the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 204 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Lisa Marshall Manheim, Belling the Cat: The Story of Vieth v. Jubelirer, in
ELECTION LAW STORIES 179, 180-81 (Joshua A. Douglas & Eugene D. Mazo eds., 2016).
3. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.) (setting hearing of the case on the
merits and postponing consideration of the question of jurisdiction), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 2017).
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Justice Kennedy’s Beauty Pageant, ATLANTIC (June 19,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/justice-kennedys-beauty-pageant/
530790/ [https://perma.cc/62P7-GZF8]. For Professor Hasen’s earlier conclusion that Justice
Kennedy has appeared to leave open no available standard that would meet his own terms,
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Court seems to want. In a quest to investigate manageable limits on
an inherently political process, the Court has been bedeviled by the
wrong question. Rather than asking “how much” partisan gerrymandering is “too much,” the Court should be asking what kind of
partisanship is improper in the redistricting context.5 This inquiry
would bring the Court back to familiar ground, harmonizing the
jurisprudence of partisan gerrymandering with the Court’s approach
to constitutional harm in other arenas. Moreover, the evidentiary
tools in this arena are equally familiar, comfortably within the
judicial role, and, when used properly, would confine judicial invalidation of a map to only exceptional cases. In partisan gerrymandering cases, focusing on the proper question would likely produce an
impact on the redistricting process that is theoretically significant
but pragmatically modest: an exercise in boundary policing well
within the Court’s usual modus operandi.
Part I of this Article proceeds with a short history of partisan
gerrymandering doctrine, capturing the Court’s struggle to settle on
a workable standard and its arrival at the present doctrinal
moment. Part II teases out the jurisprudential concerns behind that
struggle, and the Court’s vain attempts to stumble toward a measure of impermissible partisan effect as the means to satisfy the
most pertinent concerns. It then proposes, as an alternative, a
standard of impermissible partisan intent and explains how that
intent standard amply satisfies the concerns that have been motivating the Court thus far. In particular, the pragmatic deployment
of an intent standard will likely be successful only in rare cases.
Given the inherent limits of the doctrine, Part III explains why the
effort is nevertheless worthwhile.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING DOCTRINE
This Part briefly summarizes how the Court has arrived at the
present doctrinal moment with respect to partisan gerrymandering.

see Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 628 (2004).
5. See Michael Parsons, Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for
Partisan Advantage Is Unconstitutional, 24 WM . & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107, 1139 (2016).
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Because this history has been recounted in detail by others, it
receives comparatively cursory treatment here.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the Supreme Court first entered the “political thicket” of redistricting and gerrymandering in
1962.6 Previously, state and local determinations on the location of
the bounds of political districts had largely been considered questions of a “peculiarly political nature,” beyond the proper ken of the
federal judiciary.7 Then, in 1962, the Court decided Baker v. Carr,8
the case Chief Justice Earl Warren famously branded “the most important” of his tenure on the Court.9 Baker held that at least some
state redistricting decisions presented justiciable questions under
the Fourteenth Amendment,10 launching a series of federal constitutional regulations of the redistricting process later deemed the
“reapportionment revolution.”11
The initial cases of this “reapportionment revolution” confronted
a particular form of political gerrymandering: the systematic refusal to adjust district lines as urban populations grew far faster than
their rural counterparts. The disparate population growth meant
that increasingly large urban populations were packed into remarkably few districts, diluting the representation of urban voters
in state legislatures and Congress.12 The Court’s solution was a
doctrine of equal representation, requiring each local, state, and
6. The term comes from a warning issued by Justice Felix Frankfurter in Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). His point was that the topic was too
fraught with politics for the Court to intercede. See id. Of course, gerrymandering itself is far
older than the Supreme Court’s recognition of its authority to address the issue. This is the
point in any redistricting article when it is mandatory to note both that allegations of
gerrymandering date back to the very earliest American struggles over representation, see
generally ELMER C. GRIFFITH , THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (Arno Press
1974) (1907); James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from State
Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 891-94 (2006), and
that the age of a practice may be constitutionally relevant but does not itself provide
constitutional immunity, see, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (invalidating
racial segregation under the Fifth Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 552-54. But see infra text accompanying notes 124-30
(describing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, decided in 1960).
8. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
9. See EARL WARREN , THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
10. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 209, 226-29, 237.
11. See generally GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION : REPRESENTATION , POLITICAL POWER , AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966).
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-63, 567 (1964).
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federal political district to contain approximately the same population as others within the jurisdiction.13
Still, the requirement that districts be equally populated constrains only the number of people to put in each district, and not the
choices about which people to put where. Partisan actors were
engaged in the drawing of district lines. And as they drew districts,
the Court found itself confronted with further claims that the
Constitution sets limits on the degree to which partisanship may
permissibly shape the district map. These cases have yielded relatively little clarity.
In 1973’s Gaffney v. Cummings, the Court rejected a gerrymandering challenge.14 The plan in question sought to “achieve a rough
approximation of the statewide political strengths of ... the only two
parties in the State large enough to elect legislators from discernible
geographic areas.”15 That is, the plan sought roughly proportional
representation of Democrats and Republicans. The Court acknowledged that the Equal Protection Clause might prevent invidious
redistricting discrimination, employed to “minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population.”16 But it also explained that whatever the bounds of
such a doctrine (which were not further clarified), a bipartisan plan
designed for proportional representation posed no cognizable violation of equal protection.17
In Davis v. Bandemer, thirteen years later, the Court confronted
Democratic allegations that Republicans drew Indiana state legislative districts in an impermissible Republican partisan gerrymander.18 A majority agreed that the issue was justiciable,19 and a
majority agreed that the plaintiffs should not prevail, and there the
agreement ended. A plurality of four affirmed the trial court’s
determination that districts were drawn with discriminatory

13. See id. at 577 (state legislative districts); see also Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474, 476 (1968) (local government districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964)
(congressional districts).
14. See 412 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1973).
15. Id. at 752.
16. See id. at 751 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
17. See id. at 751-52.
18. See 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
19. See id. at 125.
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partisan intent, but found an insufficiently adverse effect to make
out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.20 These Justices
would have required proof not merely of resulting disadvantage at
the polls, but of “continued frustration of the will of a majority of the
voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to
influence the political process.”21
That standard is exceedingly high, and it all but precluded successful partisan gerrymandering claims. For eighteen years after
Bandemer, no lower court granted relief on a claim that district
lines were drawn with unconstitutional partisanship, and few professed to understand what plaintiffs would need to show in order to
prove such a claim.22
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court returned to the issue, assessing
another equal protection claim against partisan gerrymandering.23
In one small sense, there was unanimity: all nine Justices agreed
that “an excessive injection of politics” in the redistricting process
violates the Constitution.24 But the Court could not agree on how to
determine “excessive,” nor who should make that decision. Four Justices believed that the courts should adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims,25 but in three different opinions offered three distinct
standards for establishing a violation.26 Four rejected each of the
20. See id. at 127, 129.
21. See id. at 133. Three Justices would have found the claim to be nonjusticiable, punting
to the political branches any remedy for partisan gerrymandering claims. See id. at 144
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justices Lewis Powell and John Paul Stevens
would have affirmed the finding of an equal protection violation, based on the notion that
gerrymandering violates the Constitution when a redistricting plan serves no purpose other
than favoring a strong political bloc or disfavoring a weak one. See id. at 164 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80, 282-83 (2004) (plurality opinion).
23. See id. at 271-72.
24. See id. at 293; id. at 312, 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 318,
326 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343-44 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355, 360 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781,
782, 809-10 (2005) (noting this agreement). In the popular understanding, legislators and the
public seem to have lost this point, conflating the Court’s reluctance to fashion standards for
an Article III court’s adjudication of a partisan gerrymandering claim with a lack of constitutional limits on partisan gerrymandering. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-21 (1978).
25. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 318, 321, 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (articulating a standard largely based
on the intent to pursue partisan advantage); id. at 347-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (articulating
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proffered tests, found no workable alternative, and would have
reversed Bandemer, declaring partisan gerrymandering cases to be
nonjusticiable based on the absence of a judicially manageable
standard.27 Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself, refused to
turn back but provided little discernible way forward. He agreed
that partisan gerrymandering cases should be justiciable, but rejected all of the alternative tests offered and presented no standard
of his own.28 Instead, he offered bits and pieces of potentially promising footholds—a pinch of empiricism,29 a dash of the First Amendment30—imploring future litigants to shape the elements into a
more coherent recipe.31
Courts and litigants since have valiantly struggled to meet this
request. After a dozen years of wandering in the wilderness, a
partisan gerrymandering decision out of Wisconsin cobbled together
the scraps of binding precedent with some of the expressed concerns
of individual Justices.32 By statute, the decision of this three-judge
court is heard by the Supreme Court on direct appeal, rather than

a standard based on substantial departure from objective neutral principles in the pursuit of
partisan advantage); id. at 360-62, 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (articulating a standard based
on a minority’s unjustified entrenchment of their power over a majority).
27. See id. at 281, 305 (plurality opinion).
28. See id. at 306, 309-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
29. See id. at 312-13.
30. See id. at 314.
31. Two years later, the Court addressed another partisan gerrymandering claim but did
not offer much incremental clarity. One of the many claims in LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006), was an allegation that Texas’s decision to redraw district lines in 2003 was unconstitutional because it was accomplished for wholly partisan purposes. A majority of the Court
refused to revisit the “justiciability holding” of Bandemer. See id. at 414. But a different majority rejected the claim pressed in the case, and did so in their own splintered fashion.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas reiterated their view that such claims were
nonjusticiable. See id. at 511 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). The Chief Justice and Justice Samuel Alito explained merely that plaintiffs had not
provided a workable standard, without further explanation. See id. at 492-93 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Only Justice
Kennedy, writing again only for himself, engaged the claim substantively on the merits. In
his view, not only was the evidence of impermissible motive questionable, but also he would
have found motive alone to be insufficient to establish a violation, without a workable standard of unconstitutional representational effect. See id. at 417-18 (Kennedy, J.).
32. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 864-84 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court),
argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
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through certiorari,33 which means that the Court will rule on the
case in the 2017 term.34
The case stands on unusually fluid ground. Majorities of the
Court have on several occasions held partisan gerrymandering cases
to be justiciable.35 But no particular standard has commanded a majority of the Court in a distinct holding. Indeed, no single majority
opinion has rejected a standard, beyond rejecting any challenge to
the bipartisan proportionality of Gaffney.36 It is true that several
proposed standards have been rejected by various coalitions of five
(or more) Justices, writing separately and often with different
premises.37 But even when these overlapping negatives constitute
holdings sufficient to bind lower courts, they are remarkably weak
candidates for stare decisis treatment once the Court returns its
own attention to the issue.38 The present uneasy equilibrium—
justiciable but without a standard for “justishing”—is the very
definition of unworkable in practice, and was expressly premised on
the desire for reconsideration in light of subsequent theoretical

33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012) (requiring a three-judge trial court for any action
challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of any statewide legislative body); id.
§ 1253 (permitting direct appeal to the Supreme Court).
34. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.) (setting hearing of the case on the
merits and postponing consideration of the question of jurisdiction), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 2017).
35. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 414; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986); Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751-52 (1973).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
37. See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109;
Gaffney, 412 U.S. 735.
38. Professor Dan Lowenstein, for example, attempts to give substance to the current
state of the law only after essentially concluding that every available doctrine had been
rejected by shifting majorities: his attempt, he confesses, relies on “the principle that you can’t
replace something with nothing.” See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme
Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
367, 370 (2005). If he is fundamentally correct that differing majorities of the Court have left
us with “nothing,” however, that is all the more reason to give little stare decisis effect to
whatever it is that exists now.
In Vieth, four Justices recounted the reasons they felt it unnecessary to give substantial
weight to stare decisis in the context of the Court’s prior justiciability holdings. See Vieth, 541
U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion) (noting the lesser impact of stare decisis in constitutional
decisions than in statutory decisions, the lack of a prior agreement on a workable substantive
standard, and the lack of specific action undertaken in reliance on prior decisions). Many of
the same reasons counsel against lending strong stare decisis effect to Justices’ prior
objections against particular substantive standards as well.
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development and experience in the lower courts.39 That is, the Court
has expressly asked litigants to rescue it from the status quo of its
own making. Moreover, the Court will issue its opinion on the eve
of the 2020 census, whereupon districts large and small across the
country will have to be redrawn no matter how the Court rules.
There is therefore comparatively little risk of upsetting long-standing reliance on the present legal posture. In this unique environment, though litigants may well have strategic reason to present
theories tailored to individual Justices’ concerns, there is little
institutional reason for the Court to avoid starting from a clean
slate of first principles.
II. THE CONCERNS BEHIND THE DOCTRINE
The Justices’ repeated attempts to grapple with partisan
gerrymandering seem driven by reactions to three basic, and
shared, concerns. First is a shared acknowledgment that some
partisan regulation of the political process violates constitutional
norms, and perhaps constitutional commands, at least at the
extremes. Second is the shared notion that political bodies not only
will, but also should, act in political fashion—and that it is difficult
to distinguish this lawful activity from that which is unlawful.40
Third is the shared notion that cases turning on legislative intent41
and redistricting cases, which have inevitable electoral ramifications for individual legislators,42 make courts uncomfortable, with
even more serious discomfort at the conjunction of both streams.
Several members of the Court seem to want to address the most
egregious cases of partisan overreach. But they also seem to desperately want a screen that allows politicians room to be politicians,
turning aside all but the most egregious cases.
The first concern—the notion that extreme partisan electoral
regulation violates the Constitution—is what has kept partisan
gerrymandering claims alive, if only barely. In Vieth, this concern
39. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 312. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling for a
workable standard to “emerge”).
40. See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753 (“Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
42. See, e.g., Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753.
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commanded the agreement of all nine Justices.43 The real dispute in
that case was not over whether partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, but where to draw the line and whether the judiciary is
the appropriate arbiter.
In contrast, the latter two concerns have kept coherent partisan
gerrymandering doctrine at bay. The Justices have the responsibility to avoid undue interference with normal legislative behavior. In
the service of this goal, they have erected an as yet undefined, and
hence insurmountable, barrier to reaching the extreme partisanship
they all find disturbing. The Justices believe that they cannot
distinguish lawful from unlawful intent. And so they have pinned
their hopes on one day discovering a workable measure of unconstitutional effect.
A. The Search for a Workable Measure of Unconstitutional Effect
The Justices’ gatekeeping device of choice for partisan gerrymandering cases appears to involve the search for a standard of unconstitutional partisan impact. In this rubric, the partisan drawing of
district lines becomes constitutionally impermissible when—and
only when—deliberate partisan effects reach a particular, as yet
undetermined, magnitude. In this structure, intent still matters, in
the sense that the impermissible effects are unconstitutional only
if they are not accidental.44 But the effects analysis is the true star
of the show.
The search for a dividing line on effect has been doing the real
jurisprudential work since 1986. The Bandemer plurality was explicit on this point: the flaw in the claim presented was not the
failure to prove requisite intent, but that the intentional act did not
do sufficient constitutionally cognizable damage.45 Twenty years
later, Justice Kennedy was just as clearly focused on result: he
required a constitutionally significant “burden, as measured by a

43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
45. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127-30 (1986) (plurality opinion) (accepting the
lower court’s determination on intent but reversing for lack of a sufficiently adverse effect).
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reliable standard, on the complainants’ representational rights.”46
This theme recurs throughout the Court’s gerrymandering cases.
In one sense, this is familiar constitutional analysis. Courts regularly evaluate the magnitude of burdens imposed by public actors to
determine whether they sufficiently impair a protected outcome to
be of constitutional significance. But with respect to the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is usually the Due Process Clause, and not the Equal
Protection Clause, that is the source of such doctrine. Substantive
due process doctrine protects against the deprivation of specific
substantive rights. It is in this context that the courts will often
examine the magnitude of a burden on a right.47 So, for example,
precluding an individual from getting a marriage license may
amount to a due process violation; the simple administrative requirement to get a marriage license in the first instance does not.48
The magnitude of the imposition makes the difference. Similarly,
the constitutional battles over abortion regulations often depend on
assessments of the extent to which a regulation amounts to a
“substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.49
And courts assess laws imposing restrictions on eligible voters’
ability to cast a valid ballot by evaluating the degree of the burden
imposed.50

46. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006) (Kennedy, J.); see also Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 308 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. These burdens are then measured against the justification for their imposition.
48. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978).
49. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300, 2312-13, 2316-18
(2016); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion).
50. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190-91 (2008) (plurality
opinion). Even slight burdens must be justified, but the weight of the justification required
varies with the extent of the burden. See id. at 191.
Professor Ned Foley suggests that this line of cases is premised on equal protection rather
than due process. See Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship:
A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 684 n.118
(2017). And it is true that the Court has been less than clear about the matter, usually referring to its undue burden cases as assessing claims under the “First and Fourteenth” Amendments, without further elaboration. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
When the crux of the electoral issue is not the unequal treatment of different voters based on
a particular characteristic, but the imposition on the right to vote imposed by a law that
purports to apply across the board, the claim seems most consistent with the analysis
normally reserved for substantive due process. That said, the proper textual “location” or
“locations” of the multifaceted right (or rights) to vote is a topic well beyond this Article.
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The apparent thrust of partisan gerrymandering doctrine is very
much in this mold. Members of the Court have conceived of the partisan gerrymandering claim as one based on the voters’ “representational rights.”51 Consistent with other constitutional claims based on
the deprivation of rights, they have been searching for the appropriate constitutional threshold of partisan impairment of the representational right in question.52
In one respect, partisan gerrymandering claims have a significant
advantage over other rights claims when it comes to questions of
magnitude. It is difficult to quantify most assessments of constitutional burden. However, political scientists have developed several
tools—some old, some new—for quantitatively assessing the partisan political consequence of a district map. One tool, for example,
involves deviations from proportionality: the extent to which a
certain percentage of votes fails to translate to a concomitant percentage of seats.53 One involves deviations from partisan symmetry:
the extent to which a certain percentage of votes that translates to
a percentage of seats for one party would fail to translate to the
same percentage of seats if achieved by another party.54 One
involves the “efficiency gap” measure prominently featured in the
new Wisconsin case; it evaluates the degree to which own-party
votes have been distributed “efficiently” and opposing-party votes
have been “wasted.”55 There are many other tools.56 There are
51. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418 (Kennedy, J.).
52. Professor Mitchell Berman points out that Justice Kennedy actually seems to vacillate
between a notion of the constitutional harm in partisan gerrymandering as an imposition on
or impairment of representational rights, and a notion of the constitutional harm as an excessive deviation from other legitimate criteria, without an articulation of why that deviation
should itself be constitutionally problematic. See Berman, supra note 24, at 822-23.
53. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 402-06 (2005) (articulating and critiquing such
a standard); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting,
106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2547 (1997) (articulating, if not advocating for, such a standard).
54. So, for example, a redistricting plan in which Democrats would win 59 percent of the
seats with 52 percent of the vote, but in which Republicans would win 54 percent of the seats
with 52 percent of the vote, would exhibit a lack of partisan symmetry. See generally Bernard
Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three
Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN . L. REV. 1263, 1306-09
(2016).
55. The most “efficient” electoral result for a party in any given district is bare victory; in
contrast, both narrow losses and runaway wins are comparatively “inefficient.” The efficiency
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limitations for each of the measures, as for any tool.57 But if the
Court is seeking objective quantitative measures, there are plenty
from which to choose.58
The fundamental problem, however, has never been the absence
of a measure, nor the tool for measurement. The difficulty is with
the propriety of a particular measure, and with the designation of
gap measure assesses the comparative degree to which votes for two major parties are
“wasted”: either cast in a losing effort within a district or cast in excess of the number needed
to win. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
56. One particularly powerful tool, involving enormously sophisticated supercomputing
capacity, does not measure the degree of partisan consequence per se, but rather the degree
to which the presented partisan consequence—along any measure—is an outlier, given the
other choices the redistricting body might have otherwise chosen. See Wendy K. Tam Cho &
Yan Y. Liu, Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying
Extreme Redistricting Plans, 15 ELECTION L.J. 351, 357 (2016); cf. Jowei Chen & David
Cottrell, Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer
Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the U.S. House, 44 ELECTORAL STUD .
329 (2016) (using a series of simulations with several simplifying assumptions); Jowei Chen
& Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and the Detection
of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2015) (same). But see Micah Altman et al.,
Revealing Preferences: Why Gerrymanders Are Hard to Prove, and What to Do About It 30-32
(Mar. 23, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2583528 [https://perma.cc/L8Z5-YMSM] (critiquing simulations using simplifying assumptions as creating a biased, nonrandom sample of comparator plans); cf. Berman, supra note
24, at 839-40 (recognizing similar constraints).
57. For example, some measures may be better or worse than others in confronting
assumptions about (or variations in) turnout; assumptions about (or variations in) straightticket voting; assumptions about the most appropriate races to assess performance, and
anomalous election results in those races (including those that are uncontested); assumptions
about uniformity of response in counterfactual variations; assumptions about the degree to
which future results will mirror past outcomes; the degree of sensitivity to small outcome
changes; environments in which the two major parties are not substantially competitive;
significant pockets of third-party support; and so on.
58. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 674 (2013).
There are also, of course, plentiful quantitative redistricting measures that do not purport to
assess direct partisan consequence: manifold measures of geometric shape, population dispersion, adherence to county lines or municipal boundaries, and the like. See generally, e.g.,
Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Representation ch. 2 (Mar. 31, 1998)
(unpublished thesis, California Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
Because some (though perhaps not most) extreme partisan gerrymanders may be
accomplished by plans that are also serious outliers on one or more of these dimensions, some
scholars would identify deviant plans along these dimensions as proxy measures of unconstitutional partisan effect. See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, The Gerrymander and the Constitution:
Two Avenues of Analysis and the Quest for a Durable Precedent, 59 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1729
(2018); cf. Foley, supra note 50, at 721-23 (comparing the partisan effect of a plan with deviant
compactness to the partisan effect of a plan without, as a measure of unconstitutional effect).
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a meaningful threshold.59 The fact that we can measure distance—and that calipers, rulers, tape measures, laser rangefinders,
and odometers are all useful tools to measure distance, in different
contexts—does not indicate whether distance is the most relevant
trait for evaluating a problem, nor whether a given distance is “too
close” or “too far.”
So too with the Court’s quest for a manageable impact standard
in partisan gerrymandering. As long as the doctrine requires finding
a substantial burden on a representational right, it will require
more closely defining the affirmative representational right in question.60 The Court will have to arrive at an understanding of how
much representation a party should have under the Constitution.61
Presumably, this will require a formulation accounting for both
major parties and minor ones. Presumably, this will ultimately
require assessment (or rejection) at various points of procedural
efficacy: a vetoproof majority, a simple majority, and a committee
chairmanship may all exercise very different degrees of control over
the legislative process, and may implicate different forms of
representational rights.62 Presumably, this will require separating
deviations from the affirmative representational right that are
permissible from those that are impermissible—with the understanding that, if the effects-based standard is clear, the Court
should expect redistricting plans designed to tiptoe right up to the
impermissible line.63 Indeed, this presumably requires defining
59. See, e.g., Rave, supra note 58, at 674.
60. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial
Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 563-64 (2004).
61. Several commentators have urged that the Constitution is wholly agnostic on this
question, even in the extreme. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest in an
Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 WM . & MARY L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (2008); Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 382-83, 385.
62. The fact that any or all these questions may eventually arise, of course, does not imply
that all facets of an effects-based standard must be determined at once. Courts regularly evaluate infringement within the core of a substantive right without defining the periphery of the
right in advance. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628-29, 635-36 (2008)
(noting that a ban on handgun possession in the home for purposes of self-defense violates the
Second Amendment in the circumstances before the Court, but declining to specify further
violations of the Second Amendment or to elaborate all pertinent exceptions to that rule).
63. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 50, at 728 n.287 (recognizing this limitation). This caution
reflects experience with redistricting doctrine premised on unequal population. The Court has
determined that population deviations for state legislative districts are prima facie unconstitutional when they exceed 10 percent, and must be justified by a correspondingly weighty
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acceptable deviation from the affirmative representational right in
advance, so that we citizen frogs can identify the water as too hot
without actually having to boil first.64
In sum, before the Court can recognize a partisan gerrymander
along its current effects-based doctrinal pathway, it will have to
establish at least a range or set of substantive partisan outcomes
that are constitutionally preferred, so that it can assess impermissible “distortion of,” “deviation from,” or “burden on” those representational rights.65 That requires constitutional interpretation heavily
reliant on political science.66 To date, such outcomes have been
difficult for the Justices to locate.67
legitimate state interest. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983). Below that 10
percent mark, deviations need not be justified, and are only invalid if plaintiffs can
affirmatively prove an illegitimate interest drove the disparity. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (explaining the 10 percent threshold).
That is, the Court erected a 10 percent population deviation as a measure of presumptively
unconstitutional impact. The delineation of the 10 percent line was more or less arbitrary.
And once established, it should not have been surprising to find some redistricting bodies
drawing lines asymptotically approaching the 10 percent threshold. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 1320, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (describing a plan
with a 9.98 percent deviation), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
64. The metaphor is offered in service of the point that plaintiffs should not optimally
have to suffer through durable representational harm before knowing whether they will be
able to contest a redistricting plan causing the damage. The metaphor is premised on
amphibiological assertions that are, of course, entirely false. See, e.g., James Fallows, The
Boiled-Frog Myth: Stop the Lying Now!, ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2006), https://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2006/09/the-boiled-frog-myth-stop-the-lying-now/7446/ [https://perma.
cc/NEG4-REXU].
65. The structure of most rights claims of this sort is not that the right, once located, is
absolutely constitutionally required, but rather that the right is protected against abridgment
for all but a set of particularly favored reasons. See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not
Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD . 725,
729-31 (1998).
66. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601,
640-41 (2007); Rave, supra note 58, at 692; cf., e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[I]t is only a resort to political theory that can enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide the ‘fairest’ levels of representation.”); Foley, supra note 58 (discussing a few proposed “universalistic” conceptions of electoral
equality, and expressing skepticism that these political science measures, or any given
impermissible threshold using these measures, find root in the Constitution); Foley, supra
note 50, at 669-71 (same, with respect to the “efficiency gap” measurement).
67. The fact that agreement has not been forthcoming is not to say that such standards
are inconceivable. Some observers press the claim that a partisan majority of voters have the
constitutional right to elect a majority of representatives, finding support for such a standard
in, inter alia, the constitutional guarantee of a “Republican Form of Government.” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4; see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original
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B. An Alternative Focus on Intent
This Article does not aim to settle the Court’s present search for
a workable effects-based approach, nor does it take sides as to
whether such a standard is best articulated as an individual right
or a structural one.68 It neither proposes a standard of unconstitutional partisan impact nor declares such a standard to be unfindable.69
Instead, this Article aims to demonstrate that there is a ready
alternative for addressing partisan gerrymandering claims, which
the Court has overlooked or discarded based on what appears to be
a fundamental misunderstanding. Independent from the debate
sounding in substantive due process over a constitutionally cognizable effects-based burden on representational rights, the Court
should recognize a cause of action grounded in impermissible invidious intent.70 Such a claim would productively refocus adjudication
Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 116 (2000). Others
believe that substantive constitutional limits may be found in significant departures from
prior practice, constitutionalizing historical norms in a manner not unfamiliar to substantive
due process analysis. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 50, at 724-27; Foley, supra note 58; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 55, at 887-89; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
121-23 (1989) (describing the role of historical norms in due process analysis).
68. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60, at 577-78.
69. This Article also does not confront the wholly distinct argument over anticompetitive
or incumbent-regarding policies, including bipartisan gerrymanders of the sort validated by
Gaffney.
70. Several scholars have advanced claims concerning the recognition of invidious partisan intent in aspects of electoral regulation beyond redistricting. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson,
The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65
FLA. L. REV. 111, 120-21, 157 (2013); Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A
First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288, 291-96
(2014).
With respect to redistricting, several thoughtful scholars have articulated claims essentially
based on unconstitutional intent, but propose broad prophylactic burden-shifting presumptions of unconstitutional intent whenever legislators are involved, essentially removing
legislators from the process. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels,
116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 601, 643-44 (2002); Rave, supra note 58, at 723-24 (discussing a theory
of conflict of interest discernible through the presence of legislators drawing the lines). Others
have proffered less dramatic (but perhaps no more reliable) proxy presumptions for illicit
intent, grounded in district shape. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 50, at 668-69, 687-88, 728
(discussing a theory of constitutionally required “fair play” grounded in legislative intent, but
also turning to a burden-shifting proxy grounded in a historically rooted compactness
measure); cf. Pildes, supra note 53, at 2545-46, 2554 (advocating for effect-based measures
like compactness in the context of race and redistricting, and hinting toward such a doctrine
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not on the theoretically thorny question of “how much,” but on the
more judicially amenable question of “what kind.”71
Constitutional claims of impermissible intent focus not on the
outcomes the Constitution requires, but on the way that government
goes about its task.72 Most intent claims are more limited still: they
focus not on identifying a particular correct way for government
bodies to operate, but on specific prohibited or disfavored approaches.73 Particularly in an arena like redistricting, with many varying
and legitimate conceptions of the public good, constitutional claims
of impermissible intent are appropriately agnostic about a wide
range of representational preferences left to the political process.
They identify only a narrow range of considerations as out of
bounds. Specifically here, a cause of action focused on invidious partisan intent would merely explain that whatever other choices they
make, government actors may not punish or subordinate citizens
based on their partisan preferences.

in the partisan political realm). A few others have briefly touched on the topic, without working through the particulars. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 53, at 413-14, 417-18; Ronald A.
Klain, Success Changes Nothing: The 2006 Election Results and the Undiminished Need for
a Progressive Response to Political Gerrymandering, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 86-90 (2007)
(sketching the contours of a claim based on invidious partisan intent). Professor Berman’s
work is most extensively on point in addressing impermissible intent, though he focuses far
more on the “how much” question and far less on addressing the concerns behind the doctrine.
See generally Berman, supra note 24. And, like scholars before him, Professor Richard Fallon,
after addressing the pervasive nature of intent tests in the law, incisively critiques the entire
intent enterprise, in redistricting and beyond. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016). I have attempted
to address some of his concerns here, and I save the remainder for a forthcoming piece
addressing intent more generally. See infra notes 105, 218.
Professor Michael Kang’s recent work is a rare exception in this literature. He and I appear
to have arrived at very similar and complementary conclusions on the central importance of
intent, without finding invidious intent inextricably inherent in the legislative process and
without deploying hard-and-fast proxies for adjudicating its existence. And he and I appear
to have arrived there at much the same time, albeit by different routes. For his eloquent
exploration of a thesis similar to that expressed in this Article, see Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship, 116 MICH . L. REV.
351 (2017). See also generally Parsons, supra note 5 (raising similar issues and arriving at
some similar conclusions, albeit with less theoretical development).
71. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 5, at 1139.
72. Cf. Elana Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).
73. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1612
(1999).
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As developed in the remainder of this Article, this should not be
a radical notion. First, such a claim would bring redistricting doctrine into line with the remainder of public law.74 Second, there are
seeds of such an invidious partisan intent claim even within the
Court’s past redistricting jurisprudence,75 including gerrymandering
cases beyond the traditional historical canon that are otherwise
quite difficult to explain.76 Perhaps most important, a cause of action for invidious partisan intent avoids the real concerns mentioned
above that seem to be driving the current doctrinal morass.77 Courts
have the capacity to distinguish invidious partisanship from regular
representative politics, not by continuing to search for a distinction
in degree, but by recognizing that invidious partisan intent constitutes an observable difference of kind. Also, the existing doctrinal
infrastructure for proving intent will render successful claims rare,
serving the Court’s apparent interest in policing only the extreme
outliers.78
As an initial matter, despite frequent judicial protestations to the
contrary,79 intent claims are a regular staple of constitutional adjudication. Courts test public action for impermissible or suspect intent in a wide variety of constitutional circumstances.80 Even beyond
74. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (“A districting plan may
create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but
invidiously discriminatory because they are employed ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.’” (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey,
379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965))).
76. See, e.g., infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
78. Recognizing such a cause of action is not inconsistent with the pursuit of a cause of
action primarily based on effects. The two are independent (and potentially complementary):
a claim that some partisan gerrymandering works an unconstitutional harm by exceeding
some threshold partisan impact could exist whether or not those or other plans rose or fell
based on proven invidious motive. And a claim premised on impermissible motive could exist
whether or not there were also a claim premised on harm of a specific magnitude.
79. As just one recent example, in United States v. Windsor, Justice Scalia claimed that
“[i]t is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2707 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968)). Though the principle is indeed familiar, and frequently recited, it describes neither
formal doctrine nor actual practice in vast swaths of constitutional analysis. See infra text
accompanying notes 81-91.
80. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861 (2005) (“[G]overnmental purpose is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine.” (citing Church of the Lukumi
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familiar claims of racial81 or gender82 discrimination, or protections
against legislation based on animus,83 intent may prove determinative in adjudicating ex post facto claims or those premised on bills
of attainder;84 claims under the First Amendment,85 Fourth
Amendment,86 Fifth Amendment,87 Sixth Amendment,88 and Eighth
Amendment;89 and even potentially in adjudicating claims that a
statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,90 or that a
purported tax is actually a penalty, or vice versa.91 In each of these
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)); see also Pildes, supra
note 65, at 735.
81. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222
(1985); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-44 (1976).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
83. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-34 (1996); U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973).
84. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (declaring such doctrines applicable to
laws motivated by the desire to punish past wrongdoing, but not those motivated by nonpunitive, regulatory objectives).
85. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (declaring laws unconstitutional if passed
for the principal purpose of advancing religion); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585
(1998) (acknowledging prohibitions on public actors’ retaliation against protected speech in
other contexts); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993) (strictly scrutinizing laws with the purpose of suppressing religion or religious conduct
because of its religious significance); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (prohibiting retaliation against a public employee’s protected speech).
86. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-17 (2013) (establishing that the
implicit license permitting a police officer’s warrantless presence in the curtilage of a home
depends on the officer’s purpose for being there); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
39-42 (2000) (permitting suspicionless searches if established primarily to preserve public
safety, but not if the purpose is the detection of ordinary criminal wrongdoing).
87. See, e.g., Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600, 617-18 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring); id.
at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that confessions produced
after Miranda warnings, but procured because the same confession had earlier been extracted
before offering Miranda warnings, are inadmissible if law enforcement structured their
interrogation intentionally to subvert Miranda).
88. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358-61 (2011) (barring third parties’ out-ofcourt statements from a criminal trial if produced by a police interrogation intended to yield
evidence for future prosecution, but not if the primary purpose of the interrogation was to
enable police response to an ongoing emergency).
89. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 6 (1992) (permitting the use of force by a prison guard if motivated by the need to maintain
or restore order, but not the same use of force deployed “maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986))).
90. See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571-72 (2012) (distin-

2018]

INVIDIOUS PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING

2013

instances, an action may be constitutional or unconstitutional based
on the intent of the government actor. And that is merely a summary of constitutional claims, leaving aside statutes that call for
judicial examination of official motive. Evaluating the intent behind
public action, whether by one decision maker or many collectively,
is far more central to our legal system than courts like to admit.
With respect to partisan gerrymandering, Justices Stevens and
Powell were willing to make intent the principal driver of a
constitutional claim.92 Other Justices, however, have shied away,
apparently under the impression that there is no relevant impermissible intent in the redistricting process discernible from politics as
usual.93 This is an incorrect premise, resting on an impoverished
vocabulary of politics and partisanship.
1. The Invidious Intent that Matters
Prohibiting invidious partisan intent does not require a screed
against politics. Political choices are not only inevitable in representative public bodies, but essential to their proper function. Legislative bodies enact statutes of general application, and executive
actors choose the means by which they execute and enforce those
statutes, based on shifting—and heavily contested—notions of the
public good. Different citizens want different and often mutually
exclusive actions from the public bodies they empower, and actors
within our governmental institutions determine how to fulfill those
desires in large part based on response to various constituencies and
colleagues, sloppily intermingled with (and shaped by) the actors’
own preconceptions. The process by which politicians arrive at any
policy subject to divergent assessments of rectitude is politics as

guishing taxes from penalties based on a nonpunitive motive).
92. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 318, 321-22, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164-65 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
93. See, e.g., LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006) (Kennedy, J.); Vieth, 541 U.S. at
307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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usual.94 Redistricting is no more or less immune to this sort of
politics than every other legislative act. Nor should it be.
But the fact that political bodies are inherently political, and that
redistricting requires political choices, does not mean that all political choices are constitutionally permissible. In particular, based on
First Amendment rights of individual and group expression, and
related rights of political assembly, the Constitution generally forbids using government power in order to punish or subordinate
disfavored partisan affiliation.95 In other work, I have extensively
described why this species of what I call “tribal partisanship,” particularly in the electoral sphere, is normatively undesirable.96 It is
not, however, merely a freefloating normative harm. Given constitutional protections for political affiliation, the desire to punish or
subordinate members of an opposing partisan clan because of their
political affiliation is also an invidious and legally suspect motivation for public action.97
The patronage cases provide an example. In Elrod v. Burns, the
Court held that a public actor may not condition a non-policymaking government job on the employee’s pledge of allegiance to a
particular political party.98 A few years later, the Court determined
that government employees for whom partisanship was not particularly relevant to job performance could not be dismissed simply
94. “Political” choices are merely contested public actions in spaces where there is no
inherently correct answer. “Political” is not merely either synonym or shorthand for “partisan,” as that term is often understood: political choices will not necessarily or inherently fall
along lines defined by prominent political parties, nor will they necessarily or inherently be
driven by considerations of political party gain. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1.
95. This Article focuses on the invidious partisan intent to use the power of the state to
“punish or subordinate” adherents of an opposing partisan view. That is, it addresses affirmative government action intended to subject members of an out-group defined by political
party to inequitable and unfavorable conditions, or to artificially maintain existing inequitable and unfavorable conditions. It is informed by, but does not claim that partisan subordination is equivalent to, concerns about subordination of other out-groups. Cf., e.g., Mari J.
Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last
Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1399 (1991). And it also acknowledges that this form of
invidious partisan intent may not exhaust the universe of invidious partisan intent addressed
by the Constitution.
96. See Justin Levitt, The Partisanship Spectrum, 55 WM . & MARY L. REV. 1787, 1806-07,
1811-16 (2014).
97. See, e.g., Klain, supra note 70, at 86; Parsons, supra note 5, at 1136-37.
98. See 427 U.S. 347, 355-57, 372-73 (1976) (plurality opinion); see id. at 375 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment).

2018]

INVIDIOUS PARTISANSHIP IN REDISTRICTING

2015

because they were of the “wrong” political party.99 So far, so good:
partisan affiliation is constitutionally protected against public
retaliation. Still, these decisions could be plausibly interpreted as
cases based on effect: the threat of dismissal could be expected to
coerce or deter the employees’ protected political expression, and
perhaps that burden on expression was the only constitutional
wrong.
During the October 2016 Term, the Court put such suspicions to
rest. Heffernan v. City of Paterson helped clarify that a public employer’s improper political motivation (also) suffices to establish a
constitutional claim for employment-based harm.100 In Heffernan,
the Court addressed a claim that a police chief mistakenly believed
that a detective had engaged in political activity, and demoted the
detective because of it.101 The detective had not actually engaged in
the activity in question, and so the demotion had not actually burdened any protected activity.102 And the demotion did not on its face
give independent reason for constitutional concern: the same personnel action, undertaken for permissible reasons, would have been
constitutionally unremarkable. But the Court found that a demotion
fueled by a desire to punish the detective’s political affiliation—an
impermissible desire—amounted to a violation of the Constitution.103 It was the motive, not the effect, that made the difference.104
Tribal partisanship, then, is an unlawful impetus for government
action in the employment context, even when the desire to punish
political affiliation does not actually result in a concrete or measurable burden on political affiliation.105 First Amendment protection
99. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1980); cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill.,
497 U.S. 62, 75-76 (1990); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947)
(agreeing “that Congress may not ‘enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or
Negro shall be appointed to federal office’”).
100. See 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016).
101. See id. at 1416.
102. See id. at 1417.
103. See id. at 1418.
104. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 414 (recognizing that much of First Amendment law is
designed to sniff out improper government motive).
105. There are several potential rationales for prohibiting action based on invidious
motives, even absent a demonstrated measure of burden on an affirmative, substantive right.
First, prohibiting the invidious action may be seen as prohibiting that which is simply ultra
vires: beyond the legitimate authority of a body empowered to act on behalf of the people as
a whole. See, e.g., id. at 511; Rave, supra note 58, at 720. Second, prohibiting the invidious
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for partisan affiliation is not confined to the employment context,
and there is no reason to believe that protections against public
action reflecting tribal partisanship are limited to that context
either.106
This assertion is not, I think, controversial. For example, a tax
levied on registered Republicans solely because of their Republican
registration—a tax levied solely because an individual chose to
affiliate with a particular political team—would surely violate the
First Amendment.107 Such a tax would constitute intentional and
official action by the state, undertaken to systematically disfavor
one particular, protected, collective political expression.108 And
courts would have no difficulty distinguishing the invalid tribal
partisanship displayed by such a tax from the myriad other properly
political choices involved in any other tax levy, including tax choices
that happen to inure to the benefit of many Democratic voters or tax
choices with which Republicans might not agree.
This last point is worth repeating. The fact that legislators seeking the hypothetical tax above may be acting in order to pander to
action may instrumentally protect the substance of constitutional rights against undue
burden, if invidious acts are more likely to burden protected rights, including in ways in which
the burden is more difficult to prove than the invidious intent itself. See, e.g., Kagan, supra
note 72, at 426, 509. Third, prohibiting the invidious action may protect third parties who see
the invidious motive, and would preemptively trim their own activity so as to avoid being
subjected to it. See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418-19. Fourth, in at least some circumstances,
public action premised on an invidious motive works an expressive harm that constitutes its
own constitutional injury, and prohibiting the invidious action mitigates that expressive
harm. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532-64 (2000); Kagan, supra note 72, at 51011; Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH . L. REV. 483,
506-13 (1993). In a forthcoming work addressing claims of intent more generally, I further
develop these and other rationales for policing public activity premised primarily on intent.
See Justin Levitt, The Problems of Purpose (working title) (on file with author).
106. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 598 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge
court) (explaining that the basic principle against invidious partisan action “applies with
equal force in the redistricting context”).
107. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 337 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A legislature
controlled by one party could not, for instance, impose special taxes on members of the minority party.”).
108. Cf. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics.”); Kagan, supra note 72, at 513 (“[T]he government cannot
disadvantage a person because what she thinks or says is immoral or repellant or because
others view it as such.”).
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Democratic voters, or succumbing to political pressure by those
voters, is not particularly relevant in determining whether the tax
is constitutional. Action undertaken on legitimate policy grounds,
but motivated by a legislator’s ultimate objective of obtaining a
partisan citizen’s future electoral vote—what I call “responsive
partisanship”—is largely the engine of the modern legislative
process.109 That urge to earn partisan votes through choices among
legitimate policies is distinct from invidious tribal action undertaken against opposing partisans to punish that partisan affiliation110: it is the distinction between competition for or over voters,
and competition against them. Tax decisions undertaken because
Democrats will applaud them and Republicans will jeer them is
responsive partisanship, and constitutionally unremarkable. Tax
decisions undertaken because they will hurt voters who are Republican, because they are Republican, is invidiously tribal and
unconstitutional.
Crucially, the unconstitutionality of this tax on Republican registration would not depend on the magnitude of the tax, the difficulty
that Republicans might face in paying it, or the extent to which it
would actually deter individuals from registering with the Republican Party. That is, the unconstitutionality of the tax on Republican
registration does not depend on the degree of the practical burden
it would exact or the amount of protected activity it would
abridge.111 The tax would be unconstitutional even if it were empirically proven to deter no voter from registering as a Republican.
Like legislative acts motivated by animus, and like the demotion at
issue in Heffernan, a tax whose purpose is the subordination of
protected political expression is essentially ultra vires.112 A two-cent
tax on Republican registration is just as unconstitutional as a twohundred-dollar tax or two-million-dollar tax. The invidious purpose
is the constitutional flaw. The rest is just haggling over the price.113
If a tax on Republicans because they are Republicans is premised
on a purpose we can recognize as unconstitutionally invidious, then
109. See Levitt, supra note 96, at 1797-98, 1803-04.
110. See id. at 1798-1801, 1804-07.
111. Cf. Kang, supra note 70, at 404.
112. See supra note 105.
113. See Now We’re Just Haggling over the Price, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/03/07/haggling/ [https://perma.cc/UGV4-EAB6].
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so too is a statute levying a tax on red baseball hats—no matter the
size of the tax—if section one of the law recites that the legislature’s
purpose in imposing the tax is to punish those who affiliate with the
Republican Party.114 An invidious purpose to subordinate or systematically disfavor specific protected political affiliation remains invidious no matter the means deployed, and no matter whether those
means are overinclusive or underinclusive in accomplishing the
impermissible aim.
There is no reason to exclude partisan gerrymandering from this
general proposition.115 District lines are, of course, facially neutral.
But just as with a tax on red baseball hats, a redistricting statute
declaring in section one that the purpose of the law is to punish or
subordinate members of the Republican Party should be recognized
to be based on an unconstitutionally invidious motive, no matter
where the district lines actually fall.116
And a redistricting statute without such a declaration of purpose?
The matter is merely a question of proof. Such a statute should be
recognized as motivated by invidious tribal partisanship to the
extent—but only to the extent—that plaintiffs are able to muster
extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the lines were actually driven
by impermissible tribal partisanship.117
2. The Nature of Effect in an Invidious Intent Claim
Consistent with the Court’s approach to invidious motive in other
circumstances, a constitutional claim premised on the invidious intent to punish or subordinate a disfavored partisan affiliation would
114. Cf. Ringhand, supra note 70, at 289.
115. See Klain, supra note 70, at 87-88.
116. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“If a State passed an enactment that declared ‘All future apportionment shall be
drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights to fair and effective representation, though still
in accord with one-person, one-vote principles,’ we would surely conclude the Constitution had
been violated.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, 26-27, Gill v. Whitford, argued, No.
16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017) (posing a similar hypothetical). Note that in this hypothetical, to
which Justice Kennedy repeatedly returned in the Gill v. Whitford oral argument, the constitutionality of the statute does not depend on the extent to which any future enactments
actually accomplish the invidious goal.
117. As discussed below, this evidence will likely be more difficult to muster than the
courts appear to presume. See infra Part II.C.3.
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not be complete without a showing of discriminatory effect.118 Invidious intent may be constitutionally disfavored, but the Court has
made clear that public action undertaken pursuant to an invidious
motive does not amount to a constitutional violation on any given
plaintiff if the plaintiff ’s lot is improved, or wholly unaffected, by
the action in question.119 Crucially, though, the effect required in an
invidious intent case is not the showing of an independent breach of
a separately defined constitutional right. For a claim of invidious
partisan intent, the Court need not determine any constitutionally
required threshold of partisan fairness.120
Instead, the standard of impact for invidious intent cases
amounts to little more than the need to show tangible and redressable harm sufficient to yield standing.121 An employee has no substantive constitutional right to a particular job under particular
conditions. But she may press a constitutional claim if she can show
that a tangibly disfavorable employment action was undertaken
because of invidious and impermissible intent.122 Mr. Heffernan was
demoted, but he would have had the same constitutional claim
whether he was fired, demoted, transferred to a slightly less
desirable position, or denied one cent of earned overtime. As long as
the action was adverse, it was actionable if driven by the intent to
punish protected political activity; the magnitude of the adversity
is irrelevant.123 Accordingly, the remedy for such wrongdoing is not
118. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41, 243 (1976); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 225-26 (1971).
119. Cf. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225-26.
120. See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 818-19 (D. Md. 2017) (three-judge
court) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“It is therefore sufficient in proving a violation under [the
First Amendment] to show that a voter was targeted because of the way he voted in the past
and that the action put the voter at a concrete disadvantage. The harm is not found in any
particular election statistic, nor even in the outcome of an election, but instead [in] the intentional and targeted burdening of the effective exercise of a First Amendment representational
right.”), argued, No. 17-333 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2018).
121. Cf. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 105, at 1537 (arguing that constitutional claims
revolving around expressive harm should focus on expressed intent, and that such laws
should be invalidated “without regard to [their] further effects”).
122. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the notion
that, because there was no right to a government benefit, the benefit may be denied for any
reason).
123. “Invidious discrimination does not become less so because the discrimination accomplished is of a lesser magnitude.” Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979);
see also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 66-67, 75 (1990) (finding valid claims
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the guarantee of a particular set of job conditions, but the assurance
that job conditions will be set by a constitutionally acceptable
process, free from the taint of the invidious motive.
This emphasis on invidious intent, without requiring that discriminatory effect reach any particular threshold, comports with the
approach that the Court has taken in several redistricting cases.
Consider, for example, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, a case premised on
invidious racial action rather than invidious partisan action.124
Gomillion addressed a 1957 Alabama statute redrawing the bounds
of Tuskegee from a square to a “strangely irregular twenty-eightsided figure,” which removed the Tuskegee Institute from the city
bounds—and also removed all but four or five of the 400 African
American voters from the city limits without removing a single
white resident.125
The Court described the injury as a discriminatory deprivation “of
the municipal franchise.”126 Depriving someone of a vote is an
unquestionably serious impact. But—as the lone concurring opinion
recognized—that is not really what the statute in question did, and
it does not really describe why Alabama’s action was unconstitutional.127 Voters beyond the bounds of incorporated cities in Macon
County retained the ability to vote for local officials in county elections. Voters who had lived just outside of the preexisting square
Tuskegee boundaries were not, presumably, deprived of the municipal franchise in a constitutionally significant way by virtue of their
residence outside of pre-1957 incorporated Tuskegee.128 Nor would
Alabama’s statute have been constitutional if the legislature had
simultaneously created a new town for the 400 displaced voters:
“Black Tuskegee,” in which each of the displaced voters would have
not only in denials of employment and promotion based on invidious partisan intent, but also
the invidious partisan denial of a transfer to an office nearer the plaintiff’s home); cf. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007) (finding sufficient
injury in the mere potential for adverse decisions when one of the decision-making criteria is
insufficiently justified).
124. See 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960).
125. See id. at 341.
126. See id. at 347.
127. See id. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
128. Cf. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 61-63, 75 (1978) (refusing to
grant the right to vote in a specific municipality to residents beyond municipal bounds, even
when subject to the municipality’s police power).
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enjoyed the full benefits of the “municipal franchise,” would not
have fixed the problem. The Court never mentioned the African
American voters’ comparative political strength before and after the
boundary change, or their comparative access to relevant services;
that information might well have been critical to vote dilution
claims of a different sort,129 but it was not particularly relevant for
the claim at issue in Gomillion.
Rather, in 1957 Alabama, it was plain that the redrawn Tuskegee
municipal lines were intended to denigrate and exclude—not just
from the municipality, but from society. To the Court, that invidious
intent was self-evident. The real communicative impact of that
intent was also apparently self-evident.130 But the Court found no
need to address its size in order to find a constitutional violation. In
Gomillion, given the unmistakable invidious legislative intent, the
magnitude of the pragmatic impact on the franchise was not particularly meaningful.
The minimal role of effect in an intent-based partisan gerrymandering case is even clearer, because the Court has already addressed
one, albeit only via summary affirmance.131 Cox v. Larios affirmed
a trial court’s determination that the Georgia legislature had drawn
lines in order to intentionally subordinate the political power of
Republicans by selectively overpopulating Republican districts and
selectively pairing Republican incumbents.132 The population
disparities, in particular, amounted to plans with a total deviation
of 9.98 percent,133 within the 10 percent threshold at which population disparities for state legislative districts become presumptively
constitutionally problematic based on their impact.134 That is,
129. Cf. City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 165-168 (1982) (assessing
whether a change in municipal boundaries, along with a change in electoral rules, diluted
minority voting strength under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 615 (1982).
130. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347.
131. In the Court’s direct appeal docket, the Court will often summarily affirm a lower
court’s case, without further explanation. Such summary affirmances indicate a Court majority’s agreement with the result below, but do not further elaborate the reasons for that agreement. See, e.g., Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
132. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1329-30, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge
court) (per curiam), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
133. See id. at 1326-27.
134. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016) (explaining the 10 percent threshold).
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without an invidious purpose, any burden on voters from a state
legislative plan with a 9.98 percent population deviation does not
create constitutionally significant concern.135 But the Court affirmed
the trial court’s invalidation of those districts. If the magnitude of
the deviation was not constitutionally infirm, the constitutional invalidity must have been because—and only because—plaintiffs had
proven an invidious, illegitimate purpose.136 The fact of harm was
relevant, but not the degree of harm. Logically, any magnitude of
systematic overpopulation would have sufficed to complete the
constitutional claim, given the requisite proof of invalid intent.137
So what is the right measure of effect for a claimed invidious
partisan gerrymander that does not involve overpopulation? If invidious motive is the meaningful constitutional impropriety, any
consequent injury that establishes standing should be sufficient to
adjudicate the claim. Ample additional evidence of partisan impact
may well help in demonstrating the invidious intent behind a plan,
but such evidence should not be necessary to contest invidious
motive proven by other means.138
Because many varied circumstances may reveal an injury-in-fact,
it may be more straightforward to articulate when plaintiffs who are
able to prove invidious intent would not have a valid claim. For
example, partisan plaintiffs who have already achieved proportional
partisan strength within the jurisdiction might find it quite difficult
to articulate an injury sufficient for standing purposes, even if they

135. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973) (approving a population deviation
of 9.9 percent without evidence of invidious motive).
136. Though the summary affirmance means that observers cannot reliably discern the
precise reasons the Court thought the districts invalid, see Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176, if the
magnitude itself was not constitutionally problematic, it must be that the motive was at issue.
137. If the Democrats had sought to punish Republicans but erred, leaving all Republican
districts underpopulated (resulting in comparatively greater representational strength), Republican voters would have had no injury-in-fact, and no standing to pursue a claim. Cf. Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
138. Courts need not fear a barrage of litigation over invidious intent with vanishingly
small consequences: the more meager the damage, the harder it will be for plaintiffs to establish that the action was taken because of an invidious motive. Few entities setting out specifically to punish or subordinate are likely to aim for a negligible result. That they may,
instead, aim for a significant result that is difficult to establish or prove as significant is
reason to prefer a constitutional test focused on invidious intent without an artificial effectsbased barrier. See supra note 105.
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were able to show that the opposing party acted with invidious partisan intent.139
The fact that proportionality may preclude the ability to demonstrate injury-in-fact for an invidious intent claim does not imply
that a standard of invidious intent drives inevitably toward a
proportional partisan outcome. Nor does this render intent doctrine
an attempt to introduce a constitutional proportionality requirement on the sly.140 Many, if not most, maps drawn pursuant to
legitimate redistricting ends will lead to disproportionate partisan
results; these maps are not constitutionally assailable using a standard of invidious partisan intent.141 On the other hand, maps that
were drawn with invidious intent should be constitutionally vulnerable once they inflict any cognizable damage at all.
C. Intent and the Concerns Behind the Doctrine
For the purposes of this Article, it is not particularly relevant
whether the constitutional principle described above is located
within the First or Fourteenth Amendment—or, more likely, both.
This distinction appears to have taken on outsized importance, in
part due to Justice Kennedy’s rejection of claims thus far lodged
under the Equal Protection Clause and his invitation of claims
139. Cf. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006) (Kennedy, J.) (“[A] congressional plan
that more closely reflects the distribution of state party power seems a less likely vehicle for
partisan discrimination than one that entrenches an electoral minority.” (citing Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973))); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014-21 (1994)
(discussing the relevance of proportionality in a claim of vote dilution under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act).
As an alternative benchmark, some may believe that the failure to demonstrate retrogression—a change for the worse in practical electoral power, cf. Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1976)—would preclude a finding of injury-in-fact. Yet retrogression, a statutory
standard, does not account for some real and tangible injuries flowing from discriminatory
subordination that “merely” maintains the status quo. In the employment context, for example, the decision to block an employee’s promotion—maintaining the status quo without a
change for the worse—may still constitute actionable injury if that decision is made for
invidious reasons. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
140. See Berman, supra note 24, at 820-21 (reviewing strawman arguments purporting to
establish proportionality as a necessary constitutional standard for adjudicating partisan
gerrymandering claims); Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, “A Legislative Task”: Why Four
Types of Redistricting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 5 (2005) (making such an argument).
141. See Kang, supra note 70, at 357.
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under the First Amendment.142 Both constitutional provisions
prohibit discrimination with invidious intent against a particularly
disfavored out-group;143 both require, at least for purposes of adjudication in an Article III court, tangible harm sufficient to support
standing;144 and across the spectrum of cases beyond partisan
gerrymandering, neither requires more than that constitutional
minimum to adjudicate a claim of invidious intent. The Equal
Protection Clause begins its inquiry from the proposition that
similarly situated citizens are to be treated similarly, and travels to
the notion that attempts to punish based on political affiliation do
not reflect legally relevant differences and are therefore impermissible. The First Amendment begins its inquiry from the protection of
expressions of political affiliation, and travels to the notion that
attempts to punish only some citizens but not others based on that
protected right are impermissible. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, both provisions arrive at the same place.
1. Invidious Partisan Intent Is Not Just “Politics”
The standard articulated above satisfies the concerns I believe to
be animating the present doctrinal struggle.145 For example, a
constitutional claim that turns on establishing that maps were
drawn with the invidious intent to punish or subordinate one
political party is not designed to remove politics from the redistricting process. The Justices have repeatedly said that redistricting is
“root-and-branch a matter of politics.”146 In this, they are absolutely
correct. But the fact that redistricting involves innumerable political
choices means neither that it is, nor that it need inevitably be, nor
that it should be, root-and-branch tribally partisan.147
142. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 313-14 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
143. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (equal protection); Gaffney
v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (equal protection); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-30 (1995) (First Amendment); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (First Amendment).
144. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
145. See supra text accompanying note 43.
146. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285 (plurality opinion); see also Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 752-53.
147. Commentators have made a similar error, noting that redistricting—and politics generally—is political and involves political choices, while failing to understand that it does not
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A requirement that public officials forego action specifically intended to punish or subordinate opposing partisans leaves ample
room for redistricting bodies to engage in plenty of permissible
political calculations. In most any redistricting map, beyond the few
commands of federal law, drawers must make an array of choices,
and those choices do not have predetermined correct answers. These
choices are political.
These political choices include choices about whether to follow
certain county lines and not others, certain city lines and not others,
certain precinct lines and not others, certain roads or rivers or rail
lines and not others; about the degree to which lines should follow
Platonic geometric patterns or patterns of residential development;
about allowing certain donors or activists or communities to congregate within one district or to span district lines; about the degree
to which a district should have a distinct character or span multiple
competing interests, and which of those interests should dominate.
They include choices—even self-regarding choices—about whether
to protect incumbents, at least in the sense of consistently protecting the relationship of incumbents to their constituents, rather than
selectively protecting incumbents from their constituents.148
necessarily follow that public action to tribally punish partisan affiliation is therefore
permissible. To speak of political choices and choices premised on invidious partisan intent
is to conflate two distinct concepts. See, e.g., Klain, supra note 70, at 88; Nathaniel Persily,
In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to IncumbentProtecting Gerrymanders, Reply, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 677-79 (2002); Kevin D. Williamson,
In Praise of Gerrymandering, NAT’L REV. (June 21, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.national
review.com/article/448801/gerrymandering-supreme-court-case-redistricting-legislatures-job
[https://perma.cc/9LP6-23BH]. Michael Kang is one of the few other scholars to have not only
articulated the distinction, but found it meaningful. See Kang, supra note 70, at 368.
148. See Parsons, supra note 5, at 1146. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction.
As Justice Kennedy explained,
The Court has noted that incumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in
districting, but experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various
forms, not all of them in the interests of the constituents. If the justification for
incumbency protection is to keep the constituency intact so the officeholder is
accountable for promises made or broken, then the protection seems to accord
with concern for the voters. If, on the other hand, incumbency protection means
excluding some voters from the district simply because they are likely to vote
against the officeholder, the change is to benefit the officeholder, not the voters.
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440-41 (2006) (citation omitted); see also White v. Weiser, 412
U.S. 783, 791 (1973) (finding valid a policy “aimed at maintaining existing relationships
between incumbent congressmen and their constituents” and the drawing of district
boundaries “in a way that minimizes the number of contests between present incumbents”
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Maintaining the cores of existing districts and avoiding unnecessary
contests between incumbents may allow a more consistent base of
constituents to appraise their representative’s performance over
time; while not required, this is a constitutionally permissible
choice, and hence part of the properly political calculus.
These choices are rarely meaningfully predetermined by state
law, and may be resolved in different ways, to different degrees,
with different priorities, in different parts of a jurisdiction. Decisions to keep a farming community whole despite an intervening
county line in one part of a state, and in another portion of the state
to follow a city boundary separating two parts of a community
heavily engaged with the energy industry, are entirely political and
entirely legitimate choices. These choices may involve crass constituency calculus or fundamental choices about the nature of representation, or both at once. Those are all choices that can be and are
made by politics as usual. Indeed, those are choices made by politics
as usual even when they are made by bipartisan or multipartisan
bodies independent from the legislature, including bodies expressly
charged with foregoing tribal partisan intent.149 And even though
there are always partisan impacts to each of these choices, any
concern over those impacts is distinct from the concern over the
decision makers’ specific intent to punish or subordinate based on
political party affiliation. Politics is inherent in the act of redistricting, but invidious partisan intent is not.
Some Justices and commentators have raised a related but
slightly different issue: not the notion that redistricting is inherently political, but the notion that in a political body like a legislature, some intent to gain political—or even partisan—advantage is
inevitable.150 This instinct, too, is distinct from tribal partisan(quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966))).
149. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c) (establishing a commission); id. § 2(e) (prohibiting partisan intent); HAW . CONST. art. IV, § 2 (establishing a commission); id. § 6(2) (prohibiting districts “so drawn as to unduly favor a person or political faction”); IDAHO CONST. art. III,
§ 2 (establishing a commission); IDAHO CODE § 72-1506(8) (2017) (prohibiting the dividing of
counties “to protect a particular political party or a particular incumbent”); IOWA CODE
§§ 42.3, 42.5-.6 (2017) (establishing a commission structure); id. § 42.4(5) (prohibiting partisan intent); N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 5-b (establishing a commission structure); id. § 4(c)(5)
(prohibiting partisan intent); WASH . CONST. art. II, § 43(1) (establishing a commission); id.
§ 43(5) (prohibiting partisan intent).
150. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting); Foley, supra note 58, at 1747-48;
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ship.151 The normal route to gain political advantage is to take
action (or promote inaction) that voters favor; the normal route to
gain partisan political advantage is to take those (in)actions that
voters of a particular partisan stripe favor.152 In designing, opposing,
or enforcing virtually any legislation, public officials must prioritize
subjects and select substance from among many plausible means to
improve public welfare, and many (maybe all) of those elected in
partisan contests may make their choices based on what they
believe voters of their party prefer. Some may even make choices
they personally believe to be contrary to the public welfare based on
what they believe voters of their party prefer. Many will make
choices to avoid what they believe voters of their party least prefer
and feel strongly about.
And all of those choices are distinct from the choice to set out to
punish or subordinate voters based on their affiliation.153 That a
Democratic or Republican legislator may vote on legislation with an
eye toward improving her appeal in the next election is a very
different matter than voting on legislation designed to improve her
prospects by means other than appeal. Legislating with the intent
to improve one’s political prospects by injuring Democrats or Republicans, because they are Democrats or Republicans, is a distinctly
toxic form of partisanship, readily distinguishable from the rough
and tumble of other political choices. Moreover, not only is this invidious partisan intent distinguishable in theory, but as argued
below, it also appears as an empirical matter to be quite rare in
legislative arenas beyond redistricting.154 That rarity further indicates that it is not inherent to the legislative enterprise.
Notably, a standard of invidious partisan intent is agnostic about
the properly political choices above and the maps to which they lead.
That is, an invidious intent standard is agnostic about the right way
to draw district lines, the right things to think about when drawing
lines, and the acceptable range of political, even partisan, outcomes.
Just as it is not an attempt to purge politics from the process,
Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 387-88.
151. I have called this sort of motivation “responsive partisanship.” See supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 96, at 1797-98.
153. See id. at 1798-99.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12.
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redistricting without invidious partisan intent is not an effort to locate a system that is “fair,” much less a system that is “most fair.”155
It is, instead, only a recognition that the public intent to punish
citizens based on their partisan affiliation is unfair.156 And identifying the small range of the affirmatively unfair, leaving most other
options to the political process, is exceedingly consistent with the
normal course of constitutional adjudication. Declaring the intent
to subordinate protected political affiliation to be as impermissible
in the redistricting realm as in others does not risk throwing the
political baby out with the tribally partisan bathwater.
Even apart from the notion that tribal partisanship is ultra vires
in public action, drawing districts specifically to punish or subordinate based on political party affiliation inflicts distinct harm that
these other political choices do not.157 Assuming a modicum of competence among redistricting bodies with invidious intent,158 districts
155. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the
absence of an agreed-upon model of fair representation).
156. That which we prohibit as unfair is not merely the inverse of that which is most fair.
A tremendous amount of public policy nestles comfortably in between.
157. In addition to the harms described below, drawing districts specifically to punish or
subordinate based on political party affiliation may work additional harms when those
districts substantially deviate from recognizable territorial communities (or from the so-called
“traditional redistricting principles”—like contiguity, compactness, or adherence to political
boundaries—reflecting various proxies for territorial community). As just one example, districts deviating from community in order to achieve invidious partisan purposes may leave
constituents of the district with little in common other than party affiliation, rendering it
more difficult for the legislator to know what to represent and more difficult for the constituents to hold the legislator accountable on any substantive value beyond party membership.
See, e.g., Klain, supra note 70, at 83-84; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the
Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1392-93 (2012).
158. Professors Bernie Grofman and Tom Brunell have coined the term “dummymander”
to describe partisan gerrymanders drawn to stretch such a narrow partisan advantage over
so many districts that they are vulnerable, based on demographic shifts and wave elections,
to durable changes in partisan control. See Bernard Grofman & Thomas L. Brunell, The Art
of the Dummymander: The Impact of Recent Redistrictings on the Partisan Makeup of Southern House Seats, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 183, 184 (Peter F. Galderisi ed.,
2005). The theory is similar to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s notion that partisan gerrymanders are inherently self-limiting, because a party must convert safe seats into seats that
are less safe in order to expand its control. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 379.
The self-regulating limits of the partisan gerrymandering process often prove more visible
in theory than in practice. Though “dummymanders” exist, see Nicholas Goedert, The
Pseudoparadox of Partisan Mapmaking and Congressional Competition, 17 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 47, 48-49 (2017), in many jurisdictions under unified partisan control at the time of
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intentionally designed to subordinate voters based on party
preference are more likely to actually suppress representation of
that political viewpoint, whether that suppression is readily
measurable or not.159 And such districts are likely to do so in a way
that resists a more regular political cycle, and hence more durably
suppress that political representation, whether that durability is
readily measurable or not.160 Should an opposing party manage to
retake power despite the intended subordination, the retributive
impulse will likely drive ever-escalating exercises of invidious
partisan intent in return.161 It is to be expected that a redistricting
body intending to punish or subordinate voters based on their
affiliation will at some point achieve what it set out to achieve.
Moreover, the intent to punish or subordinate based on political
party affiliation inflicts important communicative harm. Districts
designed to subordinate voters based on party preference are also
more likely to communicate (or reinforce) the notion that representatives should enact other legislation designed to subordinate or
punish voters based on party preference, particularly in the
electoral realm, where the political consequences of such action are

redistricting, it will often be possible to create enough districts to retain ample partisan
control despite normal political cyclical effects. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60,
at 551-53; Klain, supra note 70, at 81-82; Dave Daley, How Democrats Gerrymandered Their
Way to Victory in Maryland, ATLANTIC (June 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/06/how-deep-blue-maryland-shows-redistricting-is-broken/531492/ [https://
perma.cc/2B3D-MRKP]. Seats that are “less safe” may nevertheless be sufficiently safe to
deliver victory to the gerrymandering party even if a strong opposing wave makes the district
appear to be within competitive reach. This possibility is enhanced even further in
jurisdictions without temporal limits on redistricting, in which a legislative majority may
redraw lines to fine-tune partisan advantage as often as they have the intestinal fortitude to
do so. See Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State
Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO . L.J. 1247, 1258-60, 1262-64, 1266
(2007).
159. Cf. Kagan, supra note 72, at 426, 508-09. This is not to claim that “neutral” criteria
will always yield balanced maps, or even maps that are not radically unbalanced. It is merely
an assertion that the intentional attempt to suppress an opposing party’s representation will
be more likely to yield that result than the application of some criteria that are not so
designed.
160. See Levitt, supra note 96, at 1810-15 (describing the particularly pernicious impact
of tribal partisanship in electoral policy in abridging the normal political cycle).
161. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60, at 554 (describing this dynamic in Pennsylvania); Justin Levitt, LULAC v. Perry: The Frumious Gerry-Mander, Rampant, in ELECTION
LAW STORIES, supra note 2, at 233, 234-35, 237-38, 245-48 (describing this dynamic in Texas).
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blunted.162 And when apparent, districting designed to subordinate
voters based on party preference may have a powerful communicative effect on those voters as well. Apparent gerrymandering to subordinate based on party creates (or reinforces) the perception that
voters are subject to the coercive power of an ostensibly “representative” government that not only does not represent or agree with
them, but is actively working against them, without any viable
electoral recourse.163 That democratic disconnect seems a toxic and
unsustainable consequence of constitutional inaction.
Because some of the expressive concerns above echo concerns
articulated by the Court in Shaw v. Reno in evaluating districts
drawn with an improper use of race,164 it is useful to clarify that the
claim described in this Article is not actually modeled on Shaw.
Indeed, the prominence of the Shaw approach may be part of the
morass befuddling the Court. Shaw and its progeny permit a
nuanced approach to race in redistricting, but strike at hamhandedness.165 Heightened scrutiny attaches only when significant populations are moved into or out of districts predominantly on the
basis of race, and is satisfied even under those circumstances when
the predominant attention to race is sufficiently justified.166 The
structure has evolved in an effort to acknowledge reality but fend off
stereotype: it is not the presence of race-based decision-making
that is the constitutional concern, but rather the presence of racebased decision-making that “goes too far.”
The “goes too far” question is precisely where partisan gerrymandering doctrine has become mired, and may reflect the Court’s
162. See Levitt, supra note 96, at 1812-13, 1815-16.
163. Cf. Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 645.
164. See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I ), 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (“The message that such
districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. When a district obviously
is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected
officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical
to our system of representative democracy.”); Pildes, supra note 53, at 2539 (recognizing that
this concern reflects “the social perceptions and understandings conveyed by extreme
districting practices”).
165. See Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 578-79, 591 (2016).
166. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463-64 (2017). The Court has long assumed that compliance with the Voting Rights Act constitutes one such compelling justification. See id. at 1464.
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ambivalence over policing motives that are appropriate in moderation but somehow suspect when given full-throated voice.167 This
Article’s claim is not of that ilk. It relies on a standard of invidious
partisan intent that reflects a difference in kind: public action
undertaken in order to disfavor citizens because of their party
affiliation is not merely a species of normal politics, but impermissible in any degree. In that sense, the analog for this claim in the
racial arena is not Shaw, but Gomillion.168 Recall that the Court in
Gomillion faced a gerrymander clearly communicating the intent to
disfavor the African American citizens of Tuskegee.169 Faced with
invidious intent, the Court never thought to inquire exactly how far
the lines would have to go, or what other factors the legislature may
have been considering, in order to know that they “went too far.”
And while the Court has struggled with Shaw, the principles behind
Gomillion were sufficiently clear that Justice Frankfurter—the
same Justice who would, two years later, vigorously protest intervention into the “political thicket”170—commanded effective unanimity for his opinion.171 Protections against invidious public action are
clearer than Shaw has ever been, and should be similarly straightforward in the partisanship context.172 At least, that is the theory.
Discussion of the pragmatic implementation follows below.
167. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 53, at 2538 (“In no other constitutional area [other than
Shaw ] is intent discontinuously relevant.”).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30. The Court has recognized that a Shaw
claim is “analytically distinct” from a cause of action premised on the intent to injure. See
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 513-14 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Several scholars have also addressed the degree to which the Shaw
doctrine departs from traditional constitutional concerns over invidious intent. See, e.g.,
Pildes, supra note 53, at 2510-11.
169. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341, 347 (1960).
170. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Colegrove
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion).
171. While Justice Charles Evan Whittaker concurred in the judgment, his only complaint
was that the decision should have been grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than
the Fifteenth. See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 349 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
172. The claim here is not, of course, that political harms are equivalent to racial harms—
in source, in degree, in constitutional centrality, or in any other respect. Indeed, the claim is
not even that political harms are sufficiently like racial harms to fit into a well-established
doctrinal path developed for race cases. See Charles, supra note 66, at 638; infra text accompanying note 252. Instead, I use the Shaw/Gomillion analogy to illustrate that the claim
advanced here is one of invidious intent impermissible in any measure, rather than one of
excessive deployment of a purpose otherwise permissible.
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Before turning to that implementation, however, one related
aspect of the distinctive nature of invidious intent is worth exploring. This Article has examined a claim premised on a public entity’s
intention to punish or subordinate citizens because of their affiliation with an opposition party. This sort of claim rests on a robust
history of constitutional suspicion of public action to disfavor
citizens on inappropriate grounds.173
In some circumstances, this intent to punish partisan foes will be
indistinguishable from an intent to reward partisan allies.174 For
example, an intent to subordinate may be found in a specific attempt to depress the representation of an opposing party or parties,
an attempt to relegate an opposing party to minority status, or an
attempt to relegate an opposing party to representation below a
vetoproof threshold. Any of those ends seems impossible to distinguish from an intent to durably entrench in power one’s own aligned
partisans. They are two sides of the same coin.
Short of entrenchment, it is less clear that there is no defensible
normative, doctrinal, or evidentiary distinction between the intent
to punish and an intent to promote on the basis of partisan affiliation. In other areas of the law, the intent to punish and the intent
to promote are sometimes treated as equivalent175—but not always.
Particularly when the preference is not merely a “naked preference”176—that is, when the legislature pursues some legitimate
independent public policy alongside the intent to promote legislative
allies—the specific intent to promote may be constitutionally acceptable, even where the specific intent to injure is not.177 Legislation motivated by a desire to assist unpopular “hippies,” for
example, may receive much different constitutional treatment than
legislation motivated by a desire to punish them.178
173. See, e.g., supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
174. And both are distinct from the intent to create districts reflecting rough statewide
partisan proportion, see supra text accompanying notes 14-17 (reviewing Gaffney).
175. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995).
176. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM . L. REV.
1689, 1689-90, 1693-94 (1984).
177. See, e.g., id. at 1693-95.
178. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (striking down a
legislative provision premised on a desire to harm “hippies”); id. at 545-47 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the Court seemed to be applying something other than normal
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I have decidedly mixed feelings about the constitutionality of a
public entity’s intent to promote or favor citizens in the electoral
context specifically because of their partisan affiliation. On the one
hand, the intent to favor citizens because of their partisanship, particularly when expressed as a “naked preference” otherwise unjustified, raises many of the same communicative and consequentialist
concerns as the intent to injure, and may be similarly ultra vires.179
And the related difficulties with incumbent self-dealing are both
extensive and widely recognized.180
On the other, intent to favor is not identical to intent to harm,
and even in the electoral arena, not all state action is zero-sum. For
example, in the regulation of eligible voters’ ability to cast valid
ballots, consider a law that is hypothetically justifiable by interests
other than party favoritism—say, a law allowing an extra day of
early voting or supporting a mobile center where rural residents can
cast ballots—but enacted specifically because legislators want to
facilitate the exercise of the constitutional right to vote for eligible
constituents of their own party. Such a law has a normative valence
different from that of a law that is hypothetically justifiable by
interests other than party enmity, but enacted specifically because
legislators want to burden the exercise of the constitutional right to
vote by eligible members of an opposing party.181
The fact that redistricting seems in many ways more inextricably
zero-sum than laws concerning access to the ballot complicates that
deference to hypothetically rational objectives).
The dichotomy may also be reflected in the doctrine through consideration of mixed motives
and the crediting of hypothetical justifications. For example, if a statute’s only justification
is the intent to promote legislative allies, the enactment in question might well violate the
Constitution’s basic rationality guarantee. But any hypothetically plausible foundation in
legitimate public policy rescues the enactment from constitutional disfavor based on illegitimate intent. (The fact that such cases never arise may be an indication of how many policies
can be justified by hypothetically plausible public reasons.) In contrast, the bare intent to
harm can infect a statute even with other plausible justifications, and a legislature will
instead be asked to show that it would have—not hypothetically, but actually—passed the
same statute in the absence of the invidious motive. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
180. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 595-96.
181. The scenario presented is primarily a theoretical thought exercise. In practice, claims
of unconstitutional partisan intent would likely fail in both instances for want of proof. See
infra Part II.C.3.
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picture: the more truly a partisan effort is zero-sum, the more completely an intent to promote is indistinguishable from an intent to
injure. But just as Republican is not the opposite of Democrat,182 it
is not self-evident that an intent to assist, even in the redistricting
context, is precisely the obverse face of an intent to injure.183
Ultimately, a full examination of this thorny question, and the
extent to which claims of invidious partisan punishment and claims
of invidious partisan promotion are necessarily joined, is beyond the
scope of this Article. One need not determine whether the Heffernan
principle forbids partisan favoritism, or whether the Gomillion
principle forbids racial favoritism, in order to recognize each claim
against the invidious intent to disfavor. And so this Article need not,
and does not, argue for a strictly reciprocal standard, even while
recognizing that argument’s potential (and perhaps inevitability).
For present purposes, it suffices to note that the argument for a
viable cause of action premised on the intent to punish or subordinate stands on its own merits, whatever the argument for or against
exploration of further intent-based claims in the partisan sphere.184
2. The Capacity of Courts
Not only is invalidation of invidious partisanship consistent with
retaining plentiful room for normal politics in the redistricting
process, but courts have shown that they can tell the difference
between the two. As an initial matter, the laundry list of constitutional doctrines dependent on intent shows that courts have ample
experience testing whether the intent of a public actor was discern182. Third parties are all too aware of this false but frequent equivalence.
183. It is also worth noting that neither intent implies a requirement to ignore partisanship entirely. For example, none of the concerns with invidious partisan intent—either
consequentialist or communicative—afflict the drawing of districts with the particular desire
to render them competitive. And though competitive districts could certainly run afoul of
other affirmative constitutional or statutory rights, no doctrinal history suggests that an
intent to craft competitive districts would draw any constitutional suspicion on its own. Cf.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
184. Cf. supra note 62 (explaining that courts often address the core of a constitutional
violation without precisely tracing all of the bounds of the potential periphery). Such claims
might include conceptions of “fair play,” see generally Foley, supra note 50, or more robust
nonpartisan obligations of fiduciary theory applicable to bipartisan gerrymanders as well as
partisan ones, see generally Rave, supra note 58.
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ibly problematic, as distinct from all of the other permissible
motivations for action.185
In redistricting specifically, courts have similarly been able to test
for invidious partisanship in the process without overly disturbing
the permissible status quo. Larios provides one example. Even
though the case was brought in the context of population disparities,
the legality of the plan turned on the absence or presence of invidious partisan motive.186 The Court similarly examined the population
disparities in a recent Arizona plan for evidence of illegitimate
partisanship; the Court unanimously rejected the claim, without
suggesting that the task exceeded judicial capacity.187 Other courts
have followed the Supreme Court’s lead.188 The Fourth Circuit, for
example, recently found an invidious partisan motive behind a
population deviation in the districts of Wake County, North
Carolina.189 In early 2017, a federal trial court in North Carolina did
the same in the City of Greensboro.190 In each case, the court felt
able to distinguish invidious partisan intent from other permissible
motivation.
Gill v. Whitford, the case before the Supreme Court in the October 2017 Term, provides another example.191 The lower court carefully and methodically laid out a test involving both impermissible
185. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 132-38.
187. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307, 1310 (2016).
The Harris Court framed its inquiry as an inquiry into a claim that mapmakers attempted
to “help” one political party, rather than to discriminate invidiously against another. For a
discussion of the potential distinction and the complications it creates, see supra notes 174-84
and accompanying text. This framing may help to explain why the Harris Court seemed to assume that the plaintiffs in such a case must prove the “predominance” of partisan considerations, see Harris, 136 S. Ct. at 1307, departing from the usual doctrine in cases alleging
invidious discrimination, see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333,
345, 351 (4th Cir. 2016).
189. See id. Here, the Court framed the invidious motive both as an attempt to “punish”
supporters of one political party, and as an attempt to guarantee the success of the opposing
party. See id. at 346.
190. City of Greensboro v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 251 F. Supp. 3d 935, 937
(M.D.N.C. 2017). As in Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n, the court framed the invidious motive as
a partisan manipulation of material population disparities in order to maximize that party’s
electoral success. See id. at 937, 939, 943.
191. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued,
No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
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intent and—consistent with several of the Justices’ past statements,
but as explained above, unnecessarily—a threshold of impermissible
impact.192 The court then carefully and methodically examined the
evidence put forward to establish the intent in question.193
State law provides another reason to believe that courts can
manage a prohibition on invidious partisan intent. Several states
prohibit redistricting with the intent to favor or discriminate
against a political party or candidate.194 Most of these also assign
the redistricting task to commissions with some measure of balanced bipartisanship and/or independence;195 perhaps as a result, the
question of judicial competence to evaluate invidious partisan intent
rarely arises in these states. But a few states set rules regarding
partisan intent for the legislature to follow—and for the courts to
review.196 In Florida, a prohibition on pursuing partisan favor or
disfavor was established by voter initiative,197 and the legislature
apparently took to the idea only after enforcement by the courts.
The state courts assessed whether the legislature complied with its
obligation both in an initial, abbreviated, thirty-day review by the
state supreme court,198 and through the more regular course of
litigation, accepting some evidence and rejecting others, accepting
some claims and rejecting others.199 The simple fact that the state
192. See id. at 884.
193. See id. at 890-98.
194. See Justin Levitt, Where the Lines Are Drawn—State Legislative Districts, ALL ABOUT
REDISTRICTING , http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-tablestate.php [https://perma.cc/RLW7VNEB]. Each state provision is phrased slightly differently. See id.
195. See supra note 149.
196. Of these, only Florida’s rule is set in the state constitution. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art.
III, §§ 20(a), 21(a) (prohibiting partisan intent); DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 29, § 804 (2017)
(prohibiting districts drawn “so as to unduly favor any person or political party”); OR. REV .
STAT. § 188.010(2) (2017) (prohibiting partisan intent); NEB. LEGIS. RES. 102, 102d Leg., 1st
Sess. (2011) (prohibiting partisan intent).
197. See Brown v. Sec’y of State, 668 F.3d 1271, 1273 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2012). The Florida
prohibition is phrased slightly differently than the invidious motive presented in this Article.
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a) (“No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn
with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent.”); id. § 21(a) (same).
198. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 16(c); In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative
Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 598, 617-19, 641-45, 648-51, 654, 659-62, 669-73, 676-80
(Fla. 2012); In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment 2-B, 89 So. 3d 872,
881-82, 887-91 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
199. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 179 So. 3d 258, 271-74, 279-80, 284
(Fla. 2015); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 378, 391-93, 402-13
(Fla. 2015).
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courts were able to assess—and ultimately correct—invidious partisan intent further demonstrates that tribunals can manage the
effort when they are called upon to do so.
3. The Gatekeeping Function of the Burden of Proof
As described above, the Justices need not fret about their supposed inability to separate invidious partisan intent from the regular business of politics: unpacking the concepts reveals that the two
are quite distinct, and that courts have the capacity to discern those
distinctions. The Justices also need not fret about an endless stream
of successful claims. A claim premised on invidious intent requires
proof that the alleged invidious motive actually motivated the action
in question.200 That evidentiary threshold is—properly—exacting.
Therein lies the gatekeeping function the Justices seem to be
seeking.201
Like all statutes, redistricting plans delivered through lawful
procedures arrive at the courthouse with a presumption of constitutionality.202 To prevail on a claim of invidious intent, successful
partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs would have to offer convincing
proof meeting the standard articulated in Personnel Administrator
200. Cf., e.g., Ringhand, supra note 70, at 293 (“The vexing problem with a First Amendment-based, voter viewpoint discrimination challenge to voter participation restrictions is not
one of law but of proof.”).
201. In Professor Berman’s helpful discussion of the issue, he makes clear that a “constitutional operative proposition” requires a “constitutional decision rule” for the determination
of liability in concrete cases; it is insufficient to simply embrace total epistemic uncertainty
regarding the application of constitutional meaning to particular facts. See Berman, supra
note 24, at 830-32. The decision rule involves the adjudication of a claim, including the
regulation of permissible evidence, the threshold of proof, and various rebuttable and nonrebuttable presumptions. See id. at 831-32. But while the operative proposition must be
located in sound constitutional theory, the decision rule can be “instrumental and pragmatic,”
and susceptible to adjustment depending on the Court’s taste for false negative and false
positive errors in adjudication. See id. at 837.
With respect to partisan gerrymandering, Professor Berman suggests a number of objective
and logically sophisticated quantifiable decision rules that the Court might adopt as
evidentiary thresholds for ascribing liability based on unconstitutional partisan intent. See
id. at 838-53. In contrast, and as explained below, I believe that the familiar evidentiary
thresholds for proof of invidious constitutional intent supply an adequate decision rule that
will leave only exceptional partisan gerrymanders meaningfully subject to liability.
202. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S.
259, 272 (1977).
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of Massachusetts v. Feeney: that particular lines were drawn not
merely with the knowledge of their partisan impact, or with use of
partisan information, but that they were drawn “at least in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [their] adverse effects” on a partisan group.203 This is no modest requirement.204
In the context of the Equal Protection Clause, permissible statutes may be distinguished from those premised upon an invidious
motive through “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available.”205 The same is true
for First Amendment claims.206 But despite the long-standing availability of such claims in other contexts, and the broad hypothetical
array of different forms of evidentiary support for them, there has
been no rash of successful invidious purpose claims. They exist, but
they are rare—not only because intentional invidious action is relatively rare, but also because even when invidious intent exists, it is
difficult to muster evidence sufficient to meet Feeney’s standard.207
203. See 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (emphasis added).
204. See, e.g., Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 579, 597 (D. Md. 2016) (three-judge
court) (recognizing the demanding nature of the evidentiary requirement for intent claims).
In Davis v. Bandemer, the plurality contended that “[a]s long as redistricting is done by a
legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of the
reapportionment were intended.” 478 U.S. 109, 129 (1986) (plurality opinion). To the extent
this refers to specific partisan outcomes rather than the generic welter of political choices
embodied in any plan, it is difficult to square this casual assessment with the Feeney
evidentiary standard. It should not perhaps be difficult to assume that the likely partisan
consequences were intended. But under Feeney, such an assumption does not suffice. Actually
proving that the legislature enacted a redistricting plan not only because of its assorted political consequences but specifically because of the tribally partisan punishment it would inflict
on voters of an opposing party is a different matter, and considerably more onerous.
205. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977).
206. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863-73 (2005); Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534-40 (1993).
207. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 863 (noting that the religious purpose test of
the Establishment Clause “has not been fatal very often, presumably because government
does not generally act unconstitutionally”); Derrick Darby & Richard E. Levy, Postracial
Remedies, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 387, 437 (2017) (noting that “discriminatory intent is
especially difficult to prove”).
There have been a series of recent Supreme Court cases concerning the alleged improper
use of race in redistricting. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017); BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2015). There is reason to believe that plaintiffs might well
have been justified in litigating several of these cases, or similar cases in other jurisdictions,
under a theory of invidious intent to injure. See Levitt, supra note 165, at 609-10. But perhaps
because of the difficulty of that evidentiary threshold, these cases largely proceeded not under
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The practical barriers to adequate proof are likely just as high in
redistricting cases as they are elsewhere.
Direct evidence of tribal partisanship as the motivation for a public action will likely be hard to find, at least once the Court firmly
establishes the constitutional standard. Certainly, individual
legislators make all manner of statements denigrating opposing
partisans and the parties to which they belong. And representatives’
official appeals to voters’ partisan instincts, and fomenting of the
enmity that opposing partisan voters may have for each other, are
legion.208 But outside of the regulation of electoral rules, official
expressions of invidious tribal partisanship as the rationale for state
action—using the executive or legislative power in order to injure
citizens because of their partisan affiliation—are quite rare.
Consider what such a conversation might sound like: “Look. We won
the election, and elections have consequences, so we decided to
impose a 200,000 dollar tax on every Republican, purely because
they’re Republicans.” Partisan disagreements over proper policy can
and will persist. But even in the present hyper-polarized environment, it remains beyond the pale most of the time for public actors
to make choices on taxes, health care, the environment, education,
employment regulation, criminal justice, zoning, and a host of other
issues, salient and less salient alike, on the basis that the preferred
choice is the one that injures members of the opposing political
party, specifically because they are members of the opposing political party. And if this is a rare sentiment for government officials to
hold, it is rarer still for an official to profess such a sentiment.
Commentators who have suggested that evidence of tribal partisanship would be legion because it is inherent in the normal legislative
process must somehow account for its rarity in most legislative
arenas.209
a theory of invidious intent, but under the distinct claim developed in Shaw I and its
successors. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
208. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 3-8 (2015).
209. Previously, I have discussed the theory that the primary inhibition on such tribal
partisanship is the potential for reprisal from the public, or from the opposition party if they
are able to take power. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 96, at 1841-42. But this form of raw costbenefit calculation does not account for the absence of tribal partisanship in scenarios in
which a tit-for-tat response is unlikely, nor does it seem to reflect the reasons that most
legislators likely perceive themselves to be foregoing tribal partisanship. See id. at 1842-43.
Instead, I believe that even if fear of reprisal plays a part in the calculation, most of the
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Indeed, even in the field of electoral regulation, policies are—
properly—subject to vigorous partisan disagreement, but it is
strikingly rare to find public officials justifying their choices based
on the raw desire to punish members of an opposing political party.
Most officials do not explain that they support a particular electoral
regulation because it will hurt voters with a different party affiliation.210 Conversely, as polarized as the current environment may
be, the rules of engagement in a polity in which tribal partisanship
were truly legitimate would look very different than the status quo
in any American jurisdiction.211 There is a deep—and, hearteningly,
abiding—norm in most public spheres against tribal partisanship as
a motivating force for action.212
To date, redistricting has been a rare exception, where the norm
has broken down. Tribal partisanship is neither inherent to the
process nor universal; witness Iowa, in which a legislature has
repeatedly declined to exercise partisan muscle over a process it
ultimately controls, even when that process harms particular
legislators.213 But in redistricting, it has been oddly pervasive.214 In
the redistricting context, some legislators are willing to talk about
punishing an opposing party as not only a legitimate objective,215
absence of stark tribal partisanship in the legislative process is derived from the existence of
a remarkably strong norm against such invidious motive. See id. at 1843-53.
210. Cf. id. at 1815-16, 1830-41, 1852. To say that such expressions of tribal partisanship
are rare is not to say that they are unknown. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Essmann, Chair,
Montana Republican Party, to Republican Friends (Feb. 21, 2017), http://newstalkkgvo.com/
files/2017/02/ESSMAN-LETTER-TO-GOP.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7JE-626M] (urging opposition to mail-ballot legislation otherwise justified by county budget relief, because Democrats
cast more ballots by mail, and explaining that “this bill could be the death of our effort to
make Montana a reliably Republican state”).
211. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 96, at 1830-41, 1853.
212. See id. at 1849-53.
213. See id. at 1837-38.
214. In Vieth, Justice Scalia stated that setting out to segregate voters by political affiliation—and perhaps by implication, setting out to injure voters based on their party—was
“lawful and hence ordinary.” See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (plurality opinion). I suspect that he had the causation precisely backward. Because he thought purely
partisan action in redistricting to be ordinary, he and the other Justices in the plurality were
more prepared to find it lawful.
215. See, e.g., Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050-51 (S.D. Ill. 2001)
(quoting the chair of a redistricting committee as explaining that the apportionment process
“is going to be partisan” and informing a Republican member of the committee that “[w]e are
going to shove it [the map] up your f----- ass and you are going to like it, and I’ll f--- any
Republican I can.” (alteration in original)).
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but a deserved spoil of war,216 in terms that are still hard to imagine
in any other legislative arena.217 And those who do not talk about it
are likely thinking it.
Still, the fact that jaded political observers may understand the
redistricting process at present to involve plentiful tribal partisanship does not mean that there is ample direct evidence available for
plaintiffs to prove its existence. And perhaps more important, with
an impending census and an impending redistricting cycle, even if
there were ample direct evidence of invidious tribal partisanship
from the redistricting of 2011, it would not mean that ample direct
evidence would be plentiful if the law were clarified for the redistricting of 2021. The Supreme Court has a role in establishing not
merely law, but political norms. In the wake of a Supreme Court
decision confirming tribal partisanship to be constitutionally invalid, it is reasonable to expect that fewer redistricting bodies would
actually make redistricting choices designed to punish partisan
outsiders. Furthermore, even without the salutary substantive effect, it is entirely reasonable to expect that fewer members of redistricting bodies would talk about their decisions in invidious tribal
partisan terms. There is no mechanism to peer directly into the
heart of a legislator, and the courts need not invent one.218
216. Cf. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990) (“To the victor belong only
those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained.”).
217. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 70, at 352; Klain, supra note 70, at 87-88.
218. There are, of course, pitched battles over the extent of permissible discovery into
legislative motive in any intent-based case, including fights over internal documents, fights
over communications with third parties (including, in the context of a congressional redistricting conducted by state legislators, incumbent members of Congress with no formal role
in the redistricting process), and fights over depositions. Courts have grappled with such
discovery requests in all manner of intent-based claims, not limited to the redistricting
context, but are also familiar with adjudicating discovery disputes in the context of existing
redistricting claims dependent on motive. See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 241 F. Supp. 3d 566
(D. Md. 2017) (three-judge court) (legislators); Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 114
F. Supp. 3d 323 (E.D. Va. 2015) (legislators); Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 15 F. Supp.
3d 657 (E.D. Va. 2014) (redistricting consultant); Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,
993 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1069-71 (D. Ariz. 2014) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (independent
commissioners); Hall v. Louisiana, No. 12-657-BAJ-RLB, 2014 WL 1652791, at *7-10 (M.D.
La. Apr. 23, 2014) (legislators); Perez v. Perry, 2014 WL 106927 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014)
(legislators); Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-CV-5632 (DLI)(RR)(GEL), 2013 WL 11319831 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 8, 2013) (legislators); Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (legislators);
Baldus v. Members of Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 843 F. Supp. 2d 955 (E.D. Wis. 2012)
(redistricting consultant); Baldus v. Brennan, Nos. 11-CV-562-DPW-RMD & 11-CV-1011 JPSDPW-RMD, 2011 WL 6385645 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 20, 2011) (redistricting consultant); Comm. for
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Direct evidence sufficient to prove tribal partisan intent would likely be rare in all but a few cases.
Circumstantial evidence of invidious tribally partisan motive is
also unlikely to be plentiful in most cases. Again, the constitutional
impropriety is not merely activity with the demonstrated effect of
favoring or disfavoring a partisan class, but activity undertaken
with the specific intent to punish or subordinate members of a para Fair & Balanced Map v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 11C5065, 2011 WL 4837508 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 12, 2011) (legislators); Perez v. Perry, No. SA-11-CA-635-OLG-JES-XR, 2011 WL
13112115 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2011) (members of Congress); Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d
469 (Va. 2016) (privilege for legislators under state law); League of Women Voters of Fla. v.
Fla. House of Representatives, 132 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 2013) (privilege for legislators under state
law); Dickson v. Rucho, 737 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 2013) (privilege for legislators under state law).
These discovery requests are inevitably vigorously contested by legislative counsel, and trial
courts have not shown themselves incapable of tailoring discovery to avoid undue burden. Cf.
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593, 597-601 (1998) (“[V]arious procedural mechanisms
already enable trial judges to weed out baseless claims that feature a subjective element....”).
In any event, while direct evidence is important, its role should not be overstated. First,
“direct” evidence in the context of most legislators is really a misnomer; if the relevant inquiry
is into group intent, then the only “direct” evidence is evidence produced by the group as a
whole or by individuals with the legal agency to act on the group’s behalf. This does not mean
that evidence from individual legislators is irrelevant; it means only that it may be more
circumstantial.
More fundamentally, the true goal of a constitutional intent test is neither, as some would
have it, to establish the sum of individual legislators’ subjective motives, see Fallon, supra
note 70, at 538-40; Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON . 239, 249-50 (1992), nor to establish the sum of only
the most relevant individual legislators’ subjective motives, see Fallon, supra note 70, at 540;
cf. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1417, 1423, 1436-42, 1450-51 (2003) (discussing the relevant drivers of intent in statutory
interpretation). Various constitutional, statutory, and common law contexts call for the legal
assessment of the motive of a group acting collectively—sometimes the group is private and
sometimes the group is public, sometimes the context is criminal and sometimes it is civil.
Here, as there, the inquiry essentially involves external observers’ assignment of anthropomorphized intent, based on the available evidence, to an entity without the capacity for
motive. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 105, at 1513, 1518, 1520-21, 1524-27; Fallon, supra
note 70, at 541-42; cf. Kagan, supra note 72, at 415 (assigning intent in this fashion to the
Court, in describing the Court’s development of doctrine assigning intent to other entities).
Evidence of individual legislators’ mental state is relevant, but not dispositive, in this
enterprise. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 105, at 1508, 1512-13. This is a feature, not a
bug: it is precisely in keeping with the roles that intent tests play in the law, which assigns
consequences to actions based on the external evaluation of those actions. See, e.g., id. at 1513
(making this point); Kagan, supra note 72, at 439 (collapsing the search for intent into a test
of but-for causation, evaluating whether the same statute would have been passed had the
operative intent not been present). A forthcoming paper develops this argument in much more
detail. See Levitt, supra note 105.
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ticular partisan affiliation because of that affiliation. It will be rare
that circumstantial evidence leaves this intent truly manifest. On
occasion, there may be a set of facts too suggestive to ignore.219 For
example, the legislative process may be so thoroughly shot through
with partisan subordination that it may contribute to inferences
about the invidious intent to produce partisan subordination in the
resulting map.220 Neither party-line support nor the simple rejection
of minority proposals, however, should suffice to show that the lines
were drawn with the intent to punish voters of a particular party.
The progress of maps from early drafts to later ones may also
provide relevant evidence, but only if the “revealed preferences” of
successive maps point in a sufficiently clear direction.221 Many of the
measures that scholars have proposed to measure the impact of partisan gerrymanders222 are also likely to be evidentiary grist—not, in
this context, in selecting a particular threshold of unconstitutional
effect, but in flagging results sufficiently anomalous to signal the
likelihood of troublesome intent.223 However, only the truly anomalous results would stand out, and perhaps only the truly anomalous
results would be sufficiently probative to help build a prima facie
claim. Nor would the shape of most districts indicate invidious partisanship. There are so many legitimate reasons to draw a particu219. See Kagan, supra note 72, at 442.
220. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
(noting the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading to the
decision, and the departures from the normal procedural sequence as potential indicators, in
context, of invidious intent). Procedural anomalies are relevant evidence of invidious partisan
intent. See also Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 346
(4th Cir. 2016); City of Greensboro v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 251 F. Supp. 3d 935, 94446 (M.D.N.C. 2017); Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049-51 (S.D. Ill. 2001);
League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 390-91 (Fla. 2015).
221. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 891-95 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge
court) (identifying the progression from drafts to final, and the mapmakers’ comments on
successive drafts), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017); League of Women Voters, 172 So.
3d at 380-86 (identifying the impact that consultants had on progressive versions of maps over
time); Altman, supra note 58, at 33-36 (describing the method of revealed preferences).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
223. Indeed, this accords with the way that simulations and comparative measures have
been deployed in litigation to date. See, e.g., Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n, 827 F.3d at 344, 347;
City of Greensboro, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 942-43; cf. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 910 (noting that
the anomalously extreme effects observed through one statistical calculation served as
“corroborating evidence” of an extreme partisan gerrymander that was both intentional and
durable).
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lar line in a particular place that an inference of invidious partisan
intent based on the shape of the lines themselves will seldom be
proper.224
In the normal course, then, absent specific evidence of invidious
misbehavior in the process, only partisan results that appear with
ruthless and anomalous consistency, or the absence of any legitimate motive for a districting decision otherwise consistent with
partisan ends, should support an inference that invidious tribal
partisanship was in fact at play.225 Moreover, such an inference
could always be rebutted by a demonstration that an alternative,
legitimate rationale actually drove the districting choice.226 Or,
rather than rebutting the presence of invidious intent, a redistricting body could also demonstrate that a coexisting legitimate rationale was a sufficiently strong impetus that the same decisions would
have been made even in the absence of the invidious motive.227 In
this sense, the assessment of invidious tribal partisanship would
likely function much like a version of the assessment of impermissible intent in Batson v. Kentucky.228 Given the plethora of legitimate
224. See supra text accompanying note 148.
225. On the rare occasions when a claim along these lines can be proven, it will almost
invariably concern intent with respect to the jurisdiction as a whole: a legislative or
congressional plan for an entire state or a municipal redistricting plan for an entire city or
county or school board. (Many municipal elections are nonpartisan, and not readily susceptible to such a claim in the first instance.) It is theoretically conceivable that the evidence
might establish invidious partisan intent with respect to a subjurisdiction—for example,
evidence proving an intent to ensure that Democrats or Republicans were driven out of state
legislative representation in a particular metro region, but not elsewhere. Such a scenario,
however, seems unlikely.
226. The discussion here concerns actual intent and proximate cause, not potential plausible hypotheticals. Public action proven to be the product of invidious intent is not constitutionally rescued by the notion that a different public entity acting properly might have made
the same choice for permissible reasons. This is easy to see in the context of the employment
cases. Cf. supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. Any given tangible employment
action—like firing or demotion or transfer—could be justified in the abstract; employers take
action against employees for all sorts of permissible reasons all the time. A rule insulating
intent claims based on potential hypothetical alternative rationales would never result in
liability.
227. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); cf.
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (plurality opinion) (refusing
to disregard legitimate reasons for passing a law “simply because partisan interests may have
provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators”); Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287) (discussing a similar approach to
claims of racial discrimination).
228. 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986). Batson and its progeny concern improper intent in the is-
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reasons to draw lines in particular places, in the absence of actual
invidious intent, plausible inferences would be rarely provable and
readily rebuttable.229
suance of peremptory challenges excluding potential jurors from the venire. See id. (race);
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (gender); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014) (sexual orientation). Litigants may establish a
prima facie Batson claim by citing facts properly raising an inference that opposing counsel
intentionally struck jurors on an impermissible basis; the subject of the Batson challenge may
then respond with a legitimate explanation for the peremptory strikes, and the court examines the plausibility of the proferred reason to test for pretext. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545
U.S. 231, 239, 251-52 (2005).
229. Professor Kang suggests that a norm against tribally partisan government action may
help to explain a relatively recent wave of courts pushing back against changes in election
administration. Kang, supra note 70, at 397-402. As a descriptive matter, it is entirely possible that judicial perception of improper legislative partisan intent may be playing a background role in these cases. But it is equally important to make clear—as Kang does, see id.
at 401—that the courts thus far reviewing these laws have not cited invidious partisanship
as the basis for their decisions. Furthermore, the theory explored in this Article would not
support ready proof of such a claim in all but the most exceptional circumstances.
For example, Professor Kang draws our attention to the judicial approach to various voter
identification laws. See id. at 393, 397-401. These laws are quite diverse: they vary widely in
what a voter must supply in order to cast a ballot that will be counted. See, e.g., Justin Levitt,
Voter ID Update: The Diversity in the Details, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Oct. 30,
2013), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/voter-id-update-the-diversity-in-the-details/
[https://perma.cc/GV49-Y8YL]. Though I have been quite critical of the most restrictive laws,
see Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11
ELECTION L.J. 97, 102-17 (2012), “voter ID laws” do not share the same features, will not
share the same effects, and are not all motivated by the same instincts any more than “tax
laws” or “environmental laws.” It is, of course, possible for any individual law to be motivated
by tribal partisanship. But even when true, proof will (and should) be rare. Even if an ID law
with starkly disparate partisan effects is passed on a party-line vote indicating starkly
distinct partisan priorities, see Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203, and even if similar laws were
replicated across jurisdictions with similar partisan control, see Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot
Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1370-72 (2015), those facts alone will not show that the law was
adopted because of the partisan impact on voters. And even if a concern about future fraud is
unwarranted or disproportionate, that will not usually suffice on its own to prove that an
articulated concern with fraud was insincere rather than misguided. To be clear, I am not
offering a defense of laws—including but not limited to ID laws—that exact a burden unjustified by the purported state interests behind them, or laws in which particular legislative
choices reveal racial discrimination as a motivating factor. See, e.g., N.C. State Conference of
NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216, 226-27, 229 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1399 (2017). But it will often be quite difficult to gather sufficient evidence to prove that
election administration laws with other plausible motivations were in fact driven by the
intent to punish opposing partisan voters.
Even for those who passionately believe that they understand the “real” motivation behind
various voter ID laws to be tribal partisanship, it is not a failing of a cause of action premised
on invidious partisan intent that it will not often succeed. Suspicion should not suffice for
proof of illegality. And as described in Part III below, articulating a viable cause of action has
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III. WHAT’S THE POINT?
The invocation of Batson may well raise eyebrows. The Batson
test, governing discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes
during jury selection, is sufficiently easy to satisfy that it is widely
castigated as ineffective.230 Still, without abolishing peremptory
strikes as a whole, the relevant Batson question is whether its presence is superior to its absence.231 It does not eliminate all disfavored
discrimination.232 But that need not be the goal of the doctrine.
As in most cases premised on unconstitutional intent, the standard of proof proposed here is demanding. And as with most other
doctrines premised on unconstitutional intent, I expect that a
plaintiff would succeed only in the most transparent or egregious of
cases.233 The cause of action operates by policing an outer boundary.
plentiful value even when it is rarely deployed to overturn public action.
230. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 459-61 (1996); Anna Roberts,
Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1359, 1361-62 (2012).
231. Many expressing frustration with discrimination in the peremptory process despite
Batson have called for abolishing the peremptory strike entirely, including Justice Thurgood
Marshall in Batson itself. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring). Similarly,
those who wish to excise invidious partisan intent from the redistricting process have called
for more wholesale structural reform, including fundamental re-examination of the role of
legislators in that process. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 601, 643-44; Rave, supra
note 58, at 723-24. Without disagreeing with the premises of those calls, this Article presumes
the continuing involvement of legislators in the process.
232. It is also likely that alternative tests of extreme discriminatory effect, and wholesale
judicial abdication of a relevant policing role, would similarly fail to eliminate all disfavored
discrimination.
233. Several Justices seem concerned with the specter of runaway litigation, and understandably so. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at
306-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147
(1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
The high standard of proof—and the possibilities of an adverse judgment, and the need to
bear costs and fees—may deter the filing of a case unlikely to be meritorious, even if it does
not preclude such a filing entirely. (No substantive judicial doctrine can adequately deter the
filing of an entirely frivolous case; for that, at least in federal court, there is Rule 11 and the
Christiansburg Garment potential to award fees to a prevailing defendant. See FED . R. CIV.
P. 11; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).)
But if the goal is to limit the number of redistricting cases filed, that horse is already well
out of the barn, even without a particularly viable partisan gerrymandering claim. In the 2010
cycle alone, the congressional redistricting process or result went to court in twenty-six states,
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It is not designed to drive all political considerations out of redistricting, and I am not sufficiently naïve to believe that it would, in
practice, drive even all constitutionally impermissible tribal partisanship out of redistricting. Like any other legal claim, there will be
circumstances in which invidious partisan intent exists in the world
but cannot adequately be proven.234
But the inability to attain absolute purity is not a particularly
compelling critique, for this cause of action any more than any
other.235 Policing extreme outliers may well be sufficient substantive justification for recognizing the claim. If invidious partisan
intent is unconstitutional, then the ability to confront and reject extreme manifestations of invidious partisan intent is no small benefit
to the rule of law.
Moreover, even beyond a substantive regulation of extreme partisan gerrymanders, a declaration that invidious tribal partisanship
violates the Constitution—even given the likelihood of judicial underenforcement236—would likely have four salutary effects.
First, it would align salient constitutional norms in the redistricting process with norms across the rest of the political sphere. First
Amendment protections for partisan affiliation do not currently
leave legal or moral room for public officials to punish members of
an opposing political party, expressly because of their partisan affiliation, in the vast majority of other public contexts.237 Redistricting
appears to be an anomaly, and that is perhaps because officials have
heretofore conflated judicial reluctance to engage the topic with a
grant of constitutional permission.238 One need not assume that
and the process or result for state legislative maps went to court in thirty-seven states, with
at least 240 directly relevant cases filed. See Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL
ABOUT REDISTRICTING , http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php [https://perma.cc/Q8YG-WX6K].
234. Cf. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (recognizing that some
legitimate intent cases may founder on the absence of proof).
235. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 66, at 643 (arguing that to claim that partisan gerrymandering claims are futile just because they are unsuccessful, “one would have to assume that
redistricters would behave exactly the same in a world in which the Constitution imposed no
limitations on extreme political gerrymandering as they would in a world in which there were
some vague limitations”); Foley, supra note 58, at 1760 (“But in constitutional law, like
elsewhere in life, a partial loaf of bread is much better than none at all.”).
236. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 24, at 1214-15 (recognizing that constitutional norms may
be regularly underenforced).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 95-117.
238. See Sager, supra note 24, at 1220-21.
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every public official seeks to follow the Constitution all of the time
to assume that at least some public officials take their oaths of office
seriously,239 and to assume that a Supreme Court opinion calling out
invidious tribal partisanship as unconstitutional would deter at
least the most egregious tribally partisan behavior, at least some of
the time.
Second, apart from deterring tribally partisan behavior, recognizing the unconstitutionality of invidious partisanship would deter
public expressions of tribal partisanship in the redistricting process.
This, too, has an impact on the margin. The notion that public
institutions may permissibly act to punish private individuals for
their partisan choices cannot help but degrade partisan minorities’
confidence in public institutions.240 If a Democratic legislature is
permitted to punish Republicans because they are Republicans, one
should expect Republicans to lose confidence that their local legislators, much less the government exercising coercive authority,
purport to represent their interests.241 Allowing a Democratic legislature to say that it is punishing Republicans because they are
Republicans should erode that confidence further still (and without
meaningful possibility that the consequent transparency will
facilitate political reprisal).242 Conversely, though driving invidious
partisan motives underground is unlikely to build affirmative support for public institutions, it may at least slow the rate of decline.243
Third, a viable cause of action for invidious partisan advantage
might nudge a few incremental redistricting bodies toward a more
regularized process, with more emphasis on legitimate redistricting
principles. It is worth repeating that no single regular process, nor
239. See id. at 1227.
240. See, e.g., John Fritze, Lawsuit Forces Maryland Democrats to Acknowledge the Obvious: Redistricting Was Motivated by Politics, BALT. SUN (June 1, 2017, 6:48 AM), http://www.
baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-redistricting-case-20170601-story.html
[https://perma.cc/ZT6F-CY38] (describing a deposition in which a former Governor admitted
the intent to draw districts to increase a partisan majority and suppress the electoral chances
of a partisan opposition); supra note 163 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying note 163.
242. See Levitt, supra note 96, at 1812-16 (discussing how tribal partisanship in the
electoral arena reduces the ability of voters disillusioned by the tribal partisanship to meaningfully express their displeasure).
243. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (observing that an
impermissible motive held secret may exact less expressive harm than an impermissible
motive allowed to take wing out in the open).
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any particular legitimate redistricting principle beyond equal population, is constitutionally required. And a claim for invidious motive
that revealed no other indicia of invidious partisanship would
provide no recourse for even the most erratic process or the most
random lines. But the few successful partisan gerrymandering cases
this cycle emphasized, in addition to direct evidence of partisan
intent and dramatically skewed results wholly consistent with that
motive, substantial deviations from normal process and lip service
to ostensible redistricting principles revealed in practice to be clear
pretext.244 To the extent that redistricting bodies are inclined to
limit their exposure to successful claims of invidious partisan intent,
they might be amenable to proceeding with plans in a manner
betraying a bit more order in both substance and process.
Fourth, recognizing the unconstitutionality of tribal partisanship
would tend to remove a peculiar feature of current litigation based
on the role of race in the political process.245 At the moment, public
actors frequently defend against claims based on the impermissible
presence of race in the redistricting process by claiming that they
were seeking not racial ends, but tribally partisan ends.246 The
defense is an assertion similar to: “We redrew this district not to ensure that Latinos would lose, but to ensure that Democrats would
lose.”247 When race and partisan affiliation are tightly aligned, as
244. Procedural anomalies and pretextual purported adherence to legitimate principles are
relevant evidence for claims of invidious partisan intent. Raleigh Wake Citizens Ass’n v. Wake
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 827 F.3d 333, 346, 349-50 (4th Cir. 2016); City of Greensboro v. Guilford
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 251 F. Supp. 3d 935, 944-949 (M.D.N.C. 2017); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F.
Supp. 3d 837, 891-94, 921-27 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court), argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 2017); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363, 384-85, 390-91, 40213 (Fla. 2015).
245. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 70, at 415-17.
246. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM . &
MARY L. REV. 1837 (2018); Persily, supra note 147, at 653. That this is true currently is not
to say that it has only recently arisen. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60, at 547
(assessing this argument as deployed in the 1960s).
247. When it is clear that public actors have singled out racial minorities for targeting, no
matter the “ultimate” reason, this is not actually a legally relevant defense. The intentional
dilution of Latino votes as a goal in itself, and the intentional dilution of Latino votes as the
means to achieve a distinct partisan end, both involve the intentional (and impermissible)
dilution of Latino votes. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 n.1 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Instead, the relevant defense mentioned in the text arises when it is not clear whether public officials have targeted, for example,
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they are in portions of the country, it can be difficult to disentangle
the twin claims.248
But if invidious partisan intent is indeed unconstitutional, the
party-not-race claim is an odd defense, akin to defending against
prosecution of one crime by admitting to another.249 Recognizing a
claim for partisan gerrymandering, even if no case of pure partisan
gerrymandering ever succeeded, might incrementally deter the resort to impermissible tribal partisanship as an explanation for allegedly impermissible racial action. Instead, redistricting bodies would
be forced to justify lines based on publicly permissible criteria—and,
perhaps, even draw lines based on those criteria in the first instance.
Similarly, recognizing a viable cause of action for invidious partisan gerrymandering may take some unwarranted pressure off racial
claims, at least on the margins. Just as some redistricting bodies
may be abusing protections for racial justice to pursue partisan
ends,250 some partisan actors may be tempted to bring litigation
using well-trod causes of action premised on racial harm when their
true complaint—partisan misconduct—has no viable outlet.251 Such
Latinos who happen to be Democrats or Democrats who happen to be Latinos.
248. See Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and
Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 869, 876 (2016) (defining this phenomenon as “conjoined
polarization”); Hasen, supra note 246, at 1864 (illustrating the particular difficulty some
jurisdictions will have when the vast majority of minority voters have one partisan preference
and the vast majority of nonminority voters have another). For example, in Mississippi in
2012, African American voters preferred Barack Obama about 96 percent to 4 percent, and
Anglo voters preferred Mitt Romney about 89 percent to 10 percent. See President:
Mississippi, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/MS/ president/ [https:
//perma.cc/KLE9-E9A3] (racial breakdowns may be found under the “Exit Polls” tab). Polarization along racial lines may have been even more stark in individual counties. In such
situations, it is difficult to distinguish invidious racial action from invidious partisan action.
In contrast, it may be relatively easy to distinguish partisan intent from racial intent
where partisan support is more asymmetric: in a “Peripheral South” state like Florida,
African American voters preferred Obama about 95 percent to 5 percent, but Anglo voters preferred Romney only about 61 percent to 39 percent. See President: Florida, CNN, http://www.
cnn.com/election/2012/results/state/FL/president/ [https://perma.cc/T6BU-34RE]. That distinction may allow more diagnostic precision: because of the substantial Anglo population
preferring Obama, at least some distinctions based on party will likely include more Anglo
voters than would distinctions that are actually based on race.
249. See Kang, supra note 70, at 357-58.
250. See Levitt, supra note 165, at 609.
251. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 70, at 639-40; Persily, supra note 147, at 652. As
explained above, this does not describe litigation to address the abuse of racial populations
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litigation may attempt to squeeze an ill-fitting square peg into a
round hole, with the risk of distorting legal doctrine in the racial
arena in the process.252 A viable claim for impermissible partisan
gerrymandering will not wholly eliminate misuse of claims premised
on racial harm: litigants zealously advocating on behalf of their
clients will likely attempt to deploy all of the tools available. But to
the extent that doctrines of invidious partisanship provide a path of
lesser resistance for claims truly grounded in invidious partisanship, perhaps they will help courts channel the litigation path
toward more fitting claims and away from those less applicable.
These benefits, along with the not insubstantial substantive benefit of rejecting truly exceptional outlier exemplars of provable
invidious partisan intent, justify the recognition of a claim driven by
impermissible motive. This is no denigration of the search for a due
process-based threshold of unconstitutional effect: the Constitution
does not force an either-or choice.253 Effects tests may also be useful
within the scope of an intent claim: seriously anomalous partisan
effects may be empirically likely to occur only when invidious tribal
partisanship is in fact a significant motivating factor behind a
particular map, and the failure to rebut such circumstantial evidence may in some cases properly lead to liability. But these effects
standards should not serve to limit claims in which plaintiffs have
otherwise successfully proven that a map was designed to punish or
subordinate voters because they share a particular partisan affiliation. Used as such, the effects standards are tests without a theory:
essentially arbitrary devices serving no constitutional purpose
beyond gatekeeping. Courts will likely find that the need to prove
tribal partisan intent is itself a gatekeeping device sufficient for
their purposes. Intent is enough.
to serve partisan ends, which is a racial harm no matter the ultimate partisan impact.
252. Claims meant to address the misuse of race in the redistricting process are among the
most frequently invoked claims currently wielded by partisan litigants, but they are far from
the only constitutional or statutory provisions litigants have sought to repurpose in this
fashion. As Professors Issacharoff and Karlan explain, the “first law of political thermodynamics” will continue to encourage both litigants and courts to find a way to twist other
doctrine in an attempt to address partisan excess. See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 60,
at 541-43, 569; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Appellees at 3, Gill
v. Whitford, argued, No. 16-1161 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
253. Cf. Kagan, supra note 72, at 427 (making a similar point with respect to intent-based
claims in the speech context).

